

**EVALUATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL  
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL  
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE IN  
ALBANIA, BULGARIA, UKRAINE AND LITHUANIA**

(USAID Project Nos. 180-0021 and 110-0007)

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## ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	DESCRIPTION
BAFECR	The Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party
CEE	Central and Eastern European
CEELI	Central and Eastern European Legal Initiative
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CVU	Committee of Voters of Ukraine
DG	Democracy and Governance
ENI	Europe and Newly Independent States
FSA	Freedom Support Act
GOTV	Get-Out-The-Vote
IRI	International Republican Institute
KTU	Kaunas Technical University
MP	Member of Parliament
MSI	Management Systems International
NDI	The National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States
PACD	Project Assistance Completion Date
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
SDC	The Society For Democratic Culture
SOW	Scope of Work
TDY	Temporary Duty
UDF	Union of Democratic Forces
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VOCA	Volunteers for Overseas Cooperative Assistance

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The evaluation consisted of four separate and discrete evaluations of the activities of the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Albania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Lithuania. Consequently, summaries are presented for each country evaluation. "Lessons learned" gleaned from the entire evaluation experience are presented at the end.

### ALBANIA

**IRI's** program has been effective, and its policy of working with all political parties has been a successful one. Training missions have been well focused and of appropriate length; adoption of new skills and behaviors has been tracked with an increasingly good evaluation system. Individually and as a whole, IRI's activities and accomplishments have contributed to the democratization of Albanian society--and these activities and accomplishments fit within the Country Team targets of democratization and good government.

At some point, the currently high level of receptivity and absorptive capacity will begin to diminish. The coming election will be a watershed event in the development of Albanian democracy, and may, or may not, result in a realignment of political power. The IRI Representative should conduct an assessment of continued receptivity for both parliamentary and political party training. In all likelihood, political party training activities should be scaled back after the elections. Practical receptivity on the part of political parties, given that the next elections are not scheduled until 1998, is likely to diminish drastically. If IRI decides that parliamentary receptivity is also low, there is little point keeping a representative in-country. If on the other hand, the assessment, shows that IRI should maintain an in-country representative, it is recommended that the already close cooperation between IRI and NDI become even closer. The two institutes should move from the current "push-pull" strategy to a "hand-in-glove" strategy.

Since the initiation of **NDI's** activity in Albania, its principal focus has been the creation of an indigenous NGO, the Society for Democratic Culture (SDC), that can monitor elections and promote civic education activities. The Society's performance since the General Elections of 1992 and the Constitutional Referendum in 1994 reflects sustained progress in building institutional capacity to perform the election monitoring function. The civic education function is more difficult to evaluate. However, if measured by the number of significant events that the SDC has promoted at the local level, this aspect of the SDC appears successful.

### BULGARIA

**IRI's** program in Bulgaria has been most effective during two key periods: the early days in 1990 and 1991, after the fall of Communism, and more recently, during 1995 and 1996. In large part this is a reflection of the overall political environment, and the fluctuating receptivity of the democratic parties. Paradoxically, the democratic opposition seems to have required a several year period of disunity and electoral failure before becoming more open to the practical reforms IRI had been offering all along. There is no guarantee that this new openness will continue. However, IRI,

at the moment, is in a good position to strike while the iron is hot, that is, while relatively pragmatic and receptive political figures are in the ascendance, and the prospect of a presidential election has focused the collective mind of the opposition.

The objective of creating and institutionalizing election monitoring capacity as a cornerstone of the electoral process in Bulgaria has been accomplished. The Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights (BAFECR), supported by **NDI**, is recognized as an indigenous, private, volunteer, non-partisan and technically competent institution that has sustained a excellent performance from its first activity (1990 June elections) to today. NDI's contribution to the institutionalization of BAFECR has been critical, timely and highly satisfactory. Questions remain about BAFECR's long-term ability to finance its operations.

## UKRAINE

Ukraine's political environment is an extremely difficult one in which to work. Beyond the obstructionist nature of parliament, most Ukrainians feel a deeply-ingrained suspicion toward the political process as a whole. This feeling has been intensified by the failure of political leaders to implement meaningful reforms, and by a series of pointless by-elections. **IRI's** response to this difficult political situation has been to direct its efforts almost exclusively at the local level, and to focus those efforts in a manageable number of cities, so as to have an identifiable -- albeit modest -- effect. This has been the right approach and should be continued. **IRI's** training activities are well executed, and if judged by the evaluations provided by the participants, are having significant impact. However, there are no objective criteria in place to judge the success of IRI training efforts in creating and strengthening political party infrastructure at local levels.

**NDI's parliamentary effort** seems to be reasonably well organized and on track, although we were not able to see a training event. Its **civic organization component** is clearly effective with respect to its general NGO development aims, and it deserves particular credit for its effective efforts to identify and nurture the **Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU)**. The NDI advisor is doing a sure-footed job helping the CVU, as it evolves, address such questions as financial support, managerial guidance, and relations with its local structures. NDI's effort with regard to the CVU rests on the assumption that there is space in the Ukrainian political landscape for such an organization; we encountered strong resistance to this idea from a wide range of Ukrainians on the political scene.

With regard to **NDI's political party training**, and a range of other training efforts at the local level over the last three years, NDI's objectives, activities, and target cities have undergone almost continual change. While it is laudable to have program flexibility and ambitious objectives, an effective program must also have a degree of consistency and focus to achieve results. Simply put, we think **NDI** has been trying to do too much in too many different realms. Much of its ambitious program is based on the idea that a diverse range of efforts will have a synergistic effect, but we were unable to see much evidence of this. Instead, we saw a dilution of impact, and a blurring of the line between what are admittedly genuine needs and NDI's ability effectively to address those needs.

With regard to **NDI's local government** initiative, having two advisors working in the same city must be presumed to be redundant unless close coordination has been undertaken between the two grantees, and the "latecomer" grantee -- NDI in this case -- has made a convincing and well-researched justification for doubling-up scarce resources. NDI has not made a convincing justification for its program in Lviv.

## **LITHUANIA**

**IRI** has done an effective job at transmitting political skills. What the program has not yet addressed is the creation of a mechanism to allow Lithuanians to begin transmitting those skills on their own. There is both a need for and a high degree of receptivity toward such training; key leaders in three of the larger parties expressed concrete, unprompted interest in train-the-trainers assistance. This effort should be carried out after the Parliamentary elections, when the political parties will be able to focus on developing their own internal training structures.

Mr. Levinson, representing **NDI**, is well situated to reach into municipalities using the Municipal Training Center and the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania. There is a reasonable chance that in partnership with these two institutions he may be able to impact effectively selected municipalities in terms of promoting greater citizen participation in local government. Mr. Levinson should prepare a workplan identifying activities and anticipated outcomes for each of the quarters remaining in his contract. He should be encouraged to select objectives and outcomes that reflect the current reality that he has less than nine months to work on this activity. USAID/Lithuania should have the opportunity to review the workplan before it is approved.

## **SOME LESSONS BEING LEARNED**

**Assistance on a Non-Partisan Basis Versus an Approach that Attempts to Balance the Playing Field:** The level-the-playing-field policy, while justifiable in some ways, is a high-cost strategy which should be viewed as transitional in nature and reviewed regularly to see if and when it can be dropped in favor of a non-partisan approach.

**Measuring Progress and Performance:** Training activities designed to strengthen political party organization at the grassroots were universally judged by participants and political leaders in each of the four countries as having significant impact. The Evaluation Team concurred with these judgements. However, these judgements were reached in the absence of objective criteria. To remedy this shortcoming it was recommended that a baseline be established for each of the grassroots organizations being supported by IRI and NDI.

**Training of Trainers for Political Party Development:** An option should be considered to offer a final increment of training of trainers in the area of political party development and organization. This would serve to institutionalize the training provided by IRI and NDI in the indigenous political parties.



## PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA INFORMATION

1. Countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Lithuania
2. Project Titles: The Political and Social Progress project (180-0021) and the Democratic Pluralism Project (110-0007)
3. Project Numbers: 180-0021 and 110-0007
4. Mode of Implementation: Cooperative Agreements with the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute
5. Funding:

For Central and Eastern Europe, IRI signed a cooperative agreement on August 27, 1991 funded under Project 180-0017. Six modifications have been made, including moving the program to Project 180-0021. A total of \$7,609,417 has been obligated thus far. The PACD is October 31, 1996. Cumulative obligations in the targeted country programs as of August 31, 1995 are: Albania, \$1,180,754; Bulgaria, \$1,478,699; and Lithuania, \$703,679. For the NIS, IRI signed a Cooperative Agreement on August 12, 1994 funded under project 110-0007 for \$12,000,000. A prior Cooperative Agreement funded under Project 110-0007 did not include Ukraine. The PACD is June 30, 1997. Obligations in Ukraine as of May 31, 1995 are \$1,887,680.

For Central and Eastern Europe, NDI signed a cooperative agreement on July 26, 1991, funded under Project 180-0017, at a level of \$3,230,304. The agreement ended on February 28, 1995, though the country programs to be evaluated here received continuing funding through a new cooperative agreement. This agreement is dated July 13, 1994 and is authorized at a funding level of \$3,326,724 under Project 180-0021. The PACD is currently September 30, 1996. The cumulative obligations for both cooperative agreements, as of September 30, 1995, for Albania is \$1,415,109 and for Bulgaria is \$1,478,699. For the NIS, NDI signed a cooperative agreement on June 10, 1992, funded under Project 110-0007 at a level of \$4,775,004. The agreement ended August 31, 1994. NDI signed a new cooperative agreement on August 22, 1994 for \$12,000,000 under Project 110-0007. The activity completion date is June 30, 1997. The combined obligations for both cooperative agreements in Ukraine, as of September 30, 1995 is \$3,299,101.

6. Responsible USAID Official: Deborah Berns, Bureau for Europe and the Newly Independent States
7. Previous Evaluations: None

## FORWARD

### Purpose of Evaluation

To paraphrase from the Scope of Work (See Annex A) the purpose of this evaluation was to analyze the activities implemented in Albania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Lithuania by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and assess the effectiveness of these activities. This was to be done in terms of problems, strengths and weaknesses so as to:

- # recommend actions designed to improve the on-going implementation of USAID-funded activities; and
- # provide guidance which will serve to assist IRI and NDI in extending and/or modifying ongoing activities.

### Methodology

The process for evaluating the various project activities entailed analyzing project documentation which is cited in Annex B and interviewing persons identified in Annex C involved in the monitoring and implementation of USAID-funded programs in Albania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Lithuania. Whenever possible, we attended training events.

In addition to the evaluation questions identified in the Scope of Work that were used to guide the interviews conducted by Evaluation Team members, the team reviewed each activity in terms of:

- # the management of the activity;
- # input/output mobilization of the activity; and
- # progress towards achievement of the activity's objective.

### Team Composition

**Lawrence C. Heilman** has been a Director of MSI since 1989. Previous to this, he served with USAID as a Foreign Service Officer for 20 years planning, implementing and evaluating development programs in Africa, Asia and Latin America. His particular interests are in planning and managing rural development projects, nutrition improvement and disaster recovery activities, and measurement issues relating to democracy and government interventions. He has a Ph.D. with an emphasis on Latin American institutional history. Dr. Heilman was the Evaluation Team Leader.

**Steven Voien** was a Foreign Service Officer from 1989 until 1994, when he resigned to return to the private sector. His most recent post was Sofia, Bulgaria, where he served as a reporting officer in the political/economic section. In this capacity he served on the Democracy Commission,

worked closely with non-government organizations (NGOs) and was responsible for democracy building and human rights. He has traveled widely in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.

### **Acknowledgements**

The Evaluation Team wishes to thank members of USAID, IRI and NDI staffs in Washington and in the field, and the multitude of Albanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians in the public and private sectors who contributed to the rich dialogue that characterized the evaluation process. Doors were always open and conversations both formal and informal were frank and candid, allowing for an honest exploration of the basic issues explicit in the task of the evaluation. Everyone in the evaluation process was generous in their hospitality and logistical help.

## **CHAPTER I: ALBANIA**

### **A. THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI)**

#### **1. BACKGROUND**

IRI's objectives in Albania as stated in the Scope of Work (SOW) of the evaluation are to:

- # Strengthen parliament, both as a democratic institution accessible to constituents and as an independent legislative body.
- # Enhance the political system by working to achieve more effective and representative party structures throughout the country, and to improve intra-party relationships and communication between national parties headquartered in Tirana and their local branch offices in the districts.
- # Increase the participation and effectiveness of women and women\*s organizations in the democratic process.

To achieve these objectives, IRI has conducted political party training and parliamentary outreach seminars throughout the country. It has also worked directly with members of parliament and held leadership and participation fora for women.

#### **2. FINDINGS**

##### **a. Activities to Strengthen Parliament**

Activities carried out with parliament have had a dual objective:

- # To strengthen parliamentary links with constituents, i.e., to improve accessibility, outreach, and public awareness of the legislature; and,
- # To strengthen parliament\*s institutional capacity and independence.

Much of 1994 was devoted to a series of five training missions aimed at improving outreach and public awareness. The training brought MPs and constituents together to improve lines of communication and to examine the sometimes conflicting responsibilities of a parliamentarian. Participants included MPs, local government officials and party members. The representative made consistent efforts throughout these missions to include women, redoubling those efforts (e.g., by issuing special invitations) to increase turnout and overcome patriarchal tendencies which are particularly strong outside the capital.

The training missions and the written materials left behind received high marks from the participants. Trainers coming from the U.S. were given pre-event seminars in Tirana to allow them

to tailor their message to the Albanian context; we heard virtually no complaints that TDY trainers were ignorant about the country context. Follow-up and tracking of skill transfer were somewhat sporadic in 1994, but began improving in 1995. Direct measurable results for this kind of activity are fairly difficult to obtain, but the program seems to have had a real impact on both deputies and constituents.

Efforts to strengthen parliament as an institution began in earnest in early 1995; the core of this effort was a series of six seminars on internal skills, including rules of debate, role of committees, and role of staff. MPs from all parties attended, and gave the program high marks. A parliamentary guide was published to aid legislative transparency and access. The representative worked closely with a number of NGOs, including those representing women, farmers and business people, to improve access to the drafting process in appropriate committees. Albania's first public parliamentary hearing (the Agricultural Commission) took place in fall 1995, drawing a large turnout and a positive response from both constituents and MPs. The Finance Commission has promised to hold a similar hearing with business people.

#### **b. Activities to Strengthen Political Parties**

Six training missions have focused on improving internal party structures and campaign/election skills, with a shift toward the latter as the election approaches. We spoke with participants both in Tirana and at a local level who gave concrete examples of how the training seminars had helped them improve their data bases, focus their messages, and begin to systematize efforts at candidate selection and recruitment. A pair of how-to manuals (strengthening local party structures and managing an election campaign) were distributed as part of the training, and appear to be in wide use. The seminars were open to all parties and had broad participation.

In addition, some parties requested individualized seminars/consultations, which the representative provided; these served to build on earlier training and reinforce acquisition of skills. One party subsequently held its own internal training programs based on IRI program content and materials.

In December 1995 IRI carried out a political opinion survey which drew widespread attention and has been worked into the party training program with good effect. Several of the political figures with whom we spoke gave specific examples of how their party had used poll data to refocus their image and message. President Berisha noted that the poll had helped him shift the balance of power in the Democratic Party away from elements who wanted to run on a negative, purely "anti-communist" basis to those who wanted to campaign with a more positive and issue-specific platform. Mr. Dickinson's first-rate analysis of individual political parties is exemplified in the 1994 baseline reports; this understanding has helped him focus his political party training to good effect.

#### **c. Activities to Strengthen Women in Democracy**

Albanian society is a strongly patriarchal one; efforts to involve women in the democratic process face deep-rooted cultural constraints. Mr. Dickinson has made continuing creative efforts, with varying success, to recruit women for the different training missions; participation rates in some

cases have reached 25 percent. At the same time, he has held half-day leadership and participation seminars specifically for women activists and members of NGOs in conjunction with most training missions. Follow-up has not indicated dramatic changes in behavior on a local level, but to some extent this sort of work must be evaluated as a long-term effort to change attitudes.

More immediate results can be seen with regard to NGOs and the parliament. With Mr. Dickinson's encouragement and assistance, seven women MPs formed a Parliamentary Women's Caucus, and used that caucus to press women's issues. The Women's Legal Group met with several parliamentary commissions with regard to the drafting of the new labor code and can point to what they see as improvements in that code. Mr. Dickinson has worked closely with the Independent Forum of Albanian Women and the Women's Working Group on the Elections, organized out of the Women's Center.

In addition to formal training efforts, Mr. Dickinson has been effective in using his credibility and "political insider" status to help women's groups achieve a beachhead in generally male power structures. As an example, the head of the Women's Center told us that he had personally introduced members of women's NGOs to key members of parliament, providing access they would otherwise have had difficulty achieving. Another concrete development for which Mr. Dickinson can take at least partial credit is the decision of the ruling Democratic party to set a goal of having 25 percent MPs and local party offices held by women.

#### **d. Effectiveness of the IRI Resident Representative**

From 1991 to 1994 IRI had no in-country representation in Albania, relying instead on a series of training missions. As an Evaluation Team, our most intensive efforts have been directed toward IRI activities since the current IRI representative arrived in February 1994.

IRI's in-country representative, Peter Dickinson, has been extremely effective. He has a clear understanding of his role in achieving program objectives. He has done a good job adjusting priorities and activities to respond to changing conditions on the ground. He has developed close working relationships, both formal and informal, with a broad range of Albanian political figures, parliamentarians and NGOs. As an example, he has access to President Berisha, who is well versed in and supportive of IRI activities.

Mr. Dickinson has worked closely with other foreign aid personnel to maximize his effectiveness, consulting closely with and/or carrying out joint training efforts with the Frost Task Force, Catholic Relief Services, Volunteers for Overseas Cooperative Assistance (VOCA), Land O'Lakes, Central and Eastern Europe Legal Initiative (CEELI), Small and Micro-Enterprise Development for Albania, and Peace Corps. These cooperative efforts have helped improve overall assistance impact. He maintains close contacts with the Embassy and USAID/Albania, and he works well, often on a direct collaborative basis, with the in-country NDI representative. The Evaluation Team observed an impressive joint IRI/NDI effort in Belsh, sponsored by CRS, in which the two representatives worked together to direct a workshop for members of a local parent/teacher/student organization. Each representative has a different approach and personal style, but these are appropriate to the different objectives of the two institutes, and they complement one another.

Mr. Dickinson's reporting is excellent, and the amount of time he spends on administrative and report-writing duties seems about right. IRI/Washington and USAID/Washington do not overburden him in either area, allowing him to get on with the substance of his work. The representative's strong background in both legislative activities and political campaigning has proved to be the right mix for achieving IRI's goals in Albania. His personal and political skills have allowed him to operate effectively within the highly personalized Albanian political culture. His work has given IRI enormous credibility.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS**

After five years working in Albania, IRI can point to significant and measurable impact in each of the three areas it has chosen as objectives. Its program has been effective, and its policy of working with all political parties has been a successful one. Training missions have been well focused and of appropriate length; adoption of new skills and behaviors has been tracked with an increasingly good evaluation system. Individually and as a whole, IRI's activities and accomplishments have contributed to the democratization of Albanian society--and these activities and accomplishments fit within the Country Team targets of democratization and good government.

One of the reasons IRI has been successful in Albania is the country's high degree of receptivity. Most Albanians are optimistic about the future, positive about democracy, and strongly pro-Western and pro-American; there is a lesser degree of nostalgia here than in many formerly-communist countries for the stability and certainty of the old system. At some point, however, the currently high level of receptivity and absorptive capacity will begin to diminish; this factor has been worked into our recommendations. Another factor is the upcoming round of elections. These elections will be a watershed event in the development of Albanian democracy, and may, or may not, result in a realignment of political power. Current IRI plans to publish a Parliamentary Monitor and to hold a college for new MPs in the near-term post-election period are appropriate and will remain so no matter how the elections go. In the medium-term post-election context, however, IRI may need to adjust its objectives and activities.

The IRI Representative, after the election dust has settled and prior to his departure, should conduct a full-scale evaluation of continued receptivity for both parliamentary and political party training. As noted in IRI's own reporting, despite several years of continuing effort, and some notable individual successes, parliament has not become a more accessible and independent institution. This is largely due to political forces beyond IRI's control. Nonetheless, the fact remains that public and media access to parliament have been curtailed, committee work remains closed to the public, and outreach has not been institutionalized. If this inability on parliament's part to implement real reform looks set to continue after a post-election realignment of power, IRI should take a hard look at whether the game is worth the candle. One possible conclusion would be that parliament as an institution, given current political realities, is simply not receptive to assistance.

IRI has already developed a good set of tools to use in making this assessment. The quarterly reports, particularly beginning in 1995, have been identifying benchmarks by which to measure parliament's ability to change itself as an institution. Other benchmarks might include the

number of public hearings held, number of bills sent back to the ministries for changes, number of bills originating in parliament, whether or not commission meetings are opened to the public, whether the Parliamentary Monitor (to be published fall 1996) is being used effectively, whether draft laws are available on request, and whether parliament has established a drop off point for receiving comments.

In all likelihood, political party training activities should be scaled back after the elections. Practical receptivity on the part of political parties, given that the next elections are not scheduled until 1998, is likely to diminish drastically. The winning party will have little incentive to change; the losers, after an initial “lessons-learned” period, will probably focus their efforts more on parliament and local government. This assessment may not pertain if the parliamentary elections result in an unstable, “no-clear-winner” parliament, or if a parliamentary-presidential standoff raises the prospect of pre-term elections. As part of its assessment of political party receptivity, the representative should build on his excellent party profiles by developing a set of model characteristics toward which Albanian parties should aspire (transparency, internal democracy, etc); this model can be used to quantify progress.

IRI should continue its polling efforts, with an emphasis on developing a non-partisan domestic institutional capacity which will one day be able to carry out such efforts on its own. Political figures across the political spectrum told us that IRI’s late 1995 poll was extremely useful and had helped shift the national debate to a more constructive one. IRI polling efforts should also be closely coordinated with NDI polling efforts to avoid overlap and provide sensible spacing in time.

No matter who wins the upcoming elections--and no matter whether IRI places a new in-country representative or reverts to a targeted training mission strategy--the current successful policy of working with all parties should be continued.

#### **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. ***Assessment of Parliament’s and Political Party’s Receptivity to Reform:*** After the upcoming elections, the IRI resident representative should conduct a full-scale assessment of parliament’s and political party’s receptivity to reform, as measured by concrete evaluation benchmarks. If receptivity is determined to be low, then two of IRI’s three objectives will have been rendered unreachable, and IRI should consider not placing a new representative in-country.
2. ***Change Current “Push-Pull” Model of Cooperation Between IRI and NDI to Even Closer “Hand-in-Glove” Model:*** If the end-of-tenure evaluation shows that IRI should, in fact, provide a new in-country representative, we have several further recommendations. We give high marks to the close cooperation between the current IRI and NDI representatives, but we suggest that in the parliamentary arena their cooperation become even closer, shifting from the current “push-pull” strategy to something like a “hand-in-glove” strategy. A key objective for NDI in the post election period is to improve citizen access to the legislative drafting process; a key objective for IRI has been to improve parliamentary accessibility.



Rather than simply hoping these two programs intersect, the two representatives could coordinate specific parliamentary activities, e.g., if IRI helps set up a public hearing, NDI could encourage the Society for Democratic Culture (SDC or Society) to prepare for, attend, and ask constructive questions at such a hearing. Another example: if IRI is pushing parliament to improve access to the gallery and committee meetings, NDI could work with the SDC to request passes and to actually show up at plenary sessions and committee meetings. The SDC could also organize issue-based parliamentary visits from its local clubs and youth groups; IRI could provide training to MPs on how to prepare for such visits, not in the abstract, but on the basis of an actual upcoming visit.

3. ***IRI Representative Extend Stay Through Summer 1997:*** The IRI representative is scheduled to depart in early 1997. We recommend IRI try to keep the current representative in place at least long enough to carry out the above-mentioned evaluation.
4. ***New IRI Representative:*** If a new IRI representative replaces the current one, we suggest the new representative have a similar background in both the legislative process and political party-building; this combination has worked well to date, and would continue to be important even as the program focus changes. Equally important, IRI and USAID should ensure a several week overlap between the departing and arriving representatives. Albanian politics is highly personalized; a direct handshake and introduction by the currently credible and well-liked representative would do wonders to shorten the break-in period of the new replacement.
5. ***Continue Polling to Build Indigenous Capacity:*** Continue polling, with an emphasis on skills transfer in addition to survey results.
6. ***Work with All Political Parties:*** IRI should continue the current policy of working with all political parties.
7. ***Measuring Performance from a Baseline:*** Training activities designed to strengthen political party organization are well executed, and if judged by the evaluations provided by the participants, are having significant impact. However, there are no objective criteria in place to judge the success of IRI training efforts in creating and strengthening political party infrastructure. A questionnaire should be developed to be filled out by party chairmen at all levels to determine the status of political party development for those parties taking part in the IRI training. The questionnaire would serve as the baseline against which to measure change in those areas that IRI has promoted in their training.

## **B. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI)**

### **1. BACKGROUND**

NDI's objectives as stated in the SOW for Albania are:

- # To create a local capacity for election monitoring, voter education, and get-out-the-vote campaigns and create a local advocacy group for free and fair elections.
- # To increase citizens' awareness of and interest in the democratic process; to encourage citizens to exercise their rights to hold elected representatives accountable for their actions; and to help elected officials communicate effectively their policy agendas to citizens.
- # To strengthen the management, educational, and organizational capacities of the Society for Democratic Culture (SDC) at the national and local levels, and to assist other NGOs with their developmental needs.

## **2. FINDINGS**

### **a. Election Monitoring**

NDI's primary objective has been to create an indigenous, non-government organization (NGO) to monitor elections. To this end, the Society for Democratic Culture has been the focus of NDI's support. The Society's performance since the General Elections of 1992 and the Constitutional Referendum in 1994 reflects sustained progress in building institutional capacity to perform the election monitoring function.

In past elections the Society has covered 40% of the polls in the country. In 1992 the Society had 2,500 volunteers, and on short notice produced 2,100 volunteers to cover the Constitutional Referendum in 1994. In the future the Society would like to cover 60% of the polls. Currently there are 4,800 polling sites in 100 polling zones. However, the number of zones is to increase to 115, and it is anticipated the number of polling sites will also increase. Presently the Society has approximate 2,000 members to perform monitoring functions in the coming election. The Society has a target of 3,000 volunteers to participate in the coming election. In addition to having volunteers at polling sites, the Society plans to have roving teams that will have cars in the 12 Prefectures.

The Executive Director of the Society, working closely with the NDI representative, Alicia Allison, has developed a comprehensive election plan. The Society has sent a memorandum suggesting changes to the Election Law to the Albanian Government and the political parties, and several of these changes have been incorporated in a revised law. Activities the Society will perform in the up-coming elections include:

- # Constituents meeting with their Deputies in 15 towns to hold accountability sessions
- # Technical training for volunteers
- # Candidate forums to promote citizen participation
- # Public opinion polling
- # Electronic media monitoring
- # Election day monitoring
- # Parallel tabulation

To prepare for the election activities, NDI had a team in Albania in July, 1995 to carry-out a pre-election assessment. In March, 1996 an NDI Delegation will review technical issues related to the election. For the actual election, NDI is planning to send a small delegation of observers to Albania. In addition to numerous Albanians interviewed by the Evaluation Team that commented on the need for international observers for the coming election, Ms. Allison agreed that a larger NDI observation team would be appropriate if the budget allowed.

## **b. Civic Education**

NDI is providing financial support and technical assistance through a Cooperative Agreement to assist SDC in designing and executing a civic education program. A sample of the activities executed in CY 1994 and CY 1995 that identifies the substantive focus and geographic scope of this civic education program is presented below:

### **CALENDAR YEAR 1994**

#### **February**

- # Erseka: Questionnaire prepared for forum on the economy and trade;
- # Korce: Questionnaire prepared for forum on the role of the school in preparing for your life;
- # Saranda: Forum on education legislation.

#### **March**

- # Peshkopi: Forum on environment and its protection;
- # Elbasan: Town meeting on protecting the environment and hygiene in the city;
- # Durres: Forum on youth and the role of educational institutions.

#### **April**

- # Librazhd: Round-table on educational problems and possible solutions;
- # Lushnje: Round-table on involvement of women in political life;
- # Fieri: Round-table on involvement of women in political life;
- # Devoll: Round-table on educational issues.

#### **May**

- # Burrell: Forum on what is democracy and how do we understand it;
- # Durres: Round-table on development of democracy in Eastern Europe after the period of Communism;
- # Berat: Round-table on development of democracy in Albania and involving people in their country's politics;
- # Elbasan: Questionnaire prepared for forum on drugs, alcohol and AIDS;
- # Bulqize: Forum on local government issues.

#### **June**

- # Elbasan: Town meeting with two MPs;
- # Lushnje: Round-table on the protection of the environment is a cultural responsibility.

## July

- # Kavaje: Round-table on print media and the law;
- # Durres: Seminar on women in Albanian politics in the future.

## August

- # Tirana: Round-table on participation of women in political life;
- # Kavaje: Round-table on young women in politics;
- # Saranda: Round-table on youth opinions on social problems;
- # Kavaje: Community meeting with the MP on education issues;
- # Lushnje: Round-table on local government issues.

## September

- # Erseka: Round-table on the election law;
- # Lushnje: Round-table on the authority of local government.

## October

- # Tirana: Round-table with all political parties on the Constitutional Referendum;
- # Tirana: National Conference of the SDC.

## November

- # Devoll: Round-table on ownership problems.

## CALENDAR YEAR 1995

## January

- # National level public opinion survey on Constitution;
- # Shkoder: Radio program with presentation by SDC with citizens calling in to identify the problems they would like the SDC to discuss in public forums.

## February

- # Shkoder: Forum with teachers and students on democracy in our schools.

## April

- # Durres: Round-table on mandates and responsibilities of local government;
- # Fier: Round-table on the problems of urban development in the city.

## May

- # Korca: Three radio programs with SDC presentations on recruitment of new members and live radio call-in shows with the mayor on local government issues;
- # Elbasan: Round-table on social and political problems for women;
- # Tirana: Mock town council meeting with high school students;
- # Tirana: Town meetings in the communes of Priska and Iba with local government officials and citizens.

#### June

- # Fier: Forum with local police on how to Increase public safety in our town;
- # Gjirokastra: Radio program with local government officials on how to communicate with citizens;
- # Lac: Town meeting on the role of local government;
- # Lushnje: Series of meetings on the role of government and community in maintaining schools.

#### July

- # Fier: Round-table on the role of women in the civic education of youth;
- # Korca: Radio program on the role of local government;
- # Korca: Round-table on the role of women in political life and the civic education of youth;
- # Peshkopi: Forum with MP Natasha Shehu on women in political life.

#### August

- # Bulqize: Round-table on how to make audible the citizen's voice with local government officials;
- # Devoll: SDC Club re-organization and elections;
- # Kavaje: Round-table examining the current election law;
- # Durres: Town meeting with public safety officials.

#### September

- # Bulqize: Round-table with political parties on election monitoring in a democratic culture;
- # Mirdite: Round-table with parties, local government and an environmental NGO on maintaining the environment in our town;
- # Erseka: Round-table examining the current election law and the role of citizens during election period;
- # Kruja: Round-table with local government officials on the organization and functioning of local government;
- # Kavaje: Round-table with local government officials on examining the most pressing problems of housing and social assistance.

#### October

- # Permet: Round-table on youth, education and democracy.

#### November

- # Tepelena: Forum with local government on local legislation;
- # Permet: Round-table on expressing citizens opinions on local government problems;

# Kavaje: Round-table on youths and democracy" with a MP.

December

# Elbasan: Town meeting with the MP on accountability to the citizens;

# Gjirokastra: Round-table on youths and democracy;

# Tepelena: Round-table on youths and democracy.

Nearly all civic education activities sponsored by the SDC are executed by local leadership. To prepare local leaders to identify and implement a civic education program, NDI brought trainers to Albania to run training sessions for local leaders. The training was concerned with problem identification and activity design and implementation. In CY 1995 there was a definite shift from the national to the local level in terms of who has the responsibility for orchestrating activities at the local level. These activities for the most part have promoted decentralization and citizen participation. Society personnel at the national level understand their role as coordinators and facilitators of activities implemented by local leaders. On the average 40 citizens and officials attended the public meetings identified above. Additionally, there were three nationally televised informational programs on local government and five live radio programs with elected officials discussing local government and women in politics issues.

These events informed elected officials about the opinions and priorities of the citizens they represent. Without these activities promoted by the Society, it is unlikely that this type of contact would have occurred. These events, which represented excellent organizational efforts on the part of the national SDC office and its local branches, reached into all the major population centers of Albania. The SDC distributes approximately 3,000 copies of **Vision**, a monthly newsletter, to its members.

### **c. Women in Development Components**

NDI incorporates women's issues into several areas of its activities. In February 1994, and February 1995, NDI held regional conferences on Women in Politics in Bucharest, Romania and Skopje, Macedonia. The participation of nine Albanian women in these conferences was sponsored by NDI. The women represented the Women's Forums of several political parties, representatives from a non-partisan civic action NGO and a female MP.

As a result of this conference, the Society decided to include as a component of its workplan the program area called "There can be no true democracy without equal participation of women." The Society has sponsored several round-tables during the past year on the participation of women in democratic political processes. An SDC meeting in Peshkopi on "Women and Politics" featured MP Natasha Shehu as the guest speaker and women were urged to run for office at a national or local level. An SDC local radio program in Korca discussed the current role of and obstacles encountered by women in social and political life. The Society also administered a questionnaire to solicit public opinion on the role of women in the patriotic/civic education of the youth of Albania and on women's viewpoints regarding the emigration of Albania's youth. SDC has entered into collaboration with the Women's Center (a coalition of women's NGOs and political party forums) on a project to encourage participation of women during the election period.

During 1995-6, the NDI Field Representative made presentations at two seminars hosted by the Independent Forum for Albanian Women, one on public education campaigns and one on the role of NGO Boards. Ad-hoc consultations have been held with a rural women's NGO on recruitment issues, and with the NGO "Women in Development" on proposal development and letter-writing campaigns. In 1994, NDI's field representative made presentations to the Women's Center entitled "Presenting a Message to the Government" and "Strengthening the Role of Women in Politics and Political Parties."

In May, 1995, NDI held a conference entitled "The Role of NGOs in the Legislative Process." At this conference representatives of a number of women's organizations participated. Attendees included members of "Women in Development", "Useful to Albanian Women", "Association of Professional and Business Women", "Legal and Human Rights for Women", as well as two of the female Members of Parliament.

#### **d. Youth Activities**

The SDC has engaged the youth of Albania and those who will be first-time voters in many activities during the past year. In Tirana, there is a "Youth Section" of the SDC. These individuals are loyal volunteers in terms of occasional office tasks, but they are also developing substantive program ideas and implementing a variety of opinion surveys in their high schools. They have designed a "get-out-the-vote" (GOTV) publication directed specifically at youth. Also in the capital, the Tirana branch president organized an activity for local high school students which looked at a variety of features of democratic society, including public debate and consensus building, and illustrated those themes by implementing a mock town council meeting.

In local branches of the SDC throughout Albania, numerous events have targeted youth. In Kavaje, the SDC sponsored a forum for students with their MP. In Fier, a round-table on political issues and perceptions on the media was organized for students. In Shkoder, SDC arranged a meeting for students with the Police Chief to discuss public safety issues in the community and problems that the youth identified as priorities. "Youth and Democracy" activities have also been held in Permet, Tepelena, Gjirokastra and Saranda.

#### **e. SDC Organizational Capacity**

Ms. Allison sees her primary task to assist the Society in its transition to a self-sustaining institution focused on deepening democratic culture in Albania. To this end, she has assisted the Society in strengthening and consolidating its internal management systems and external program operations. Ms. Allison is in the process of assisting SDC staff develop proposals to obtain additional funding. To date four proposals totaling \$63,000 have been approved. NDI/Washington has also prepared a draft guide concerned with fund-raising techniques to assist NGOs in seeking alternative financial resources. The Society is making use of this draft guide.

The paid staff in the national office consists of the Executive Director, Executive Secretary and Translator, Finance Chief, Assistant Director, Office Manager, Regional Coordinator and Press Person. Each of the staff members have demonstrated good facility for accomplishing the tasks

outlined in their job descriptions. The monthly performance report and the monthly financial report prepared by the staff reflect a high management standard characteristic of SDC operations.

It has been difficult to run a staff development program for the Tirana-based staff given the its small size and its daily administrative and program implementation responsibilities. Job descriptions exist and there have been staff retreats which have contributed to strengthening the organization. Staff turnover has slowed the institutionalization process, but this problem appears to have been solved at this juncture.

#### **f. NGO Development**

NDI has also been concerned with strengthening other NGOs. NDI/Washington, in collaboration with the SDC and Ms. Allison, held a conference in Tirana in May, 1995 entitled "The Role of NGOs in the Legislative Process." This conference was attended by representatives of 35 indigenous NGOs. Ms. Allison has followed-up with individual consultations with a number of the NGOs that attended this conference including one NGO which has addressed the issue of "Violence Against Women" and another NGO concerned with promoting a rehabilitation center for the Albanian Paraplegic Association.

#### **g. NDI Performance**

Ms. Allison is certainly the right person for the task of providing timely advice regarding the strengthening of the Society. Though not experienced in the "electioneering" game, she more than compensates for this lack expertise with a mature sense of how to assist in building an indigenous institution dedicated to democracy building in a society where there are no precedents for an activity of this nature. She operates on a shoe-string budget, walking or riding her bicycle to most of her appointments in Tirana. She was preceded by a series of representatives, including Tom Melia, Jonas Rolett and Christin Engelhardt, each of whom made important contributions at critical junctures in strengthening institutional capacity of the Society. In sum, the performance of NDI in supporting the development of the Society has been superb.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS**

As the Society approaches this next national election, it has its reputation intact as a non-partisan, private and voluntary organization. The Society has arrived in terms of performing the election monitoring function and has made a major contribution to democracy in Albania through helping ordinary citizens have faith in the legitimacy of the electoral process. NDI has done an excellent job in assisting the Society and now can stand aside and let the Society perform the technical activities related to election monitoring. However, the problem of the Society's financial sustainability persists. NDI must continue to assist the Society in addressing the problem.

The fact that the Society is funded 100% through the mechanism of a Cooperative Agreement with NDI, which is in turn funded through a Cooperative Agreement with USAID, is well known by the leaders of the major political parties in Albania. The USG funding is perceived as a valuable contribution to strengthening democracy in Albania.



In the process of working with the Society to institutionalize its capacity, there have been many bumps in the road. Initially, NDI worked with older citizens and then there was a period when the organization was dominated by university students. The Society is presently run by a young staff located in Tirana with direction being provided by an Executive Committee with membership throughout the country. Each of the NDI resident advisors has treated Society members as partners. The Society was allowed to make their own mistakes. However, the "make or break" issue was that the Society must never cross the line with regards to losing its non-partisan character. The NDI advisors always promoted the independence of the Society and sought ways to promote the Society's sustainability. These two concerns have been at the core of NDI's approach.

Clearly the SDC has been responding to the "felt needs" of the citizens through its civic education program. The sustained effort to build a democratic culture represents an excellent use of modest resources to address a truly heroic objective. On a significant number of occasions, MPs took part in this process. In most cases personnel from nation building departments at the local level were represented and played key roles in these public fora.

Though NDI has successfully assisted the Society in becoming a viable, non-partisan organization performing the complicated tasks of election monitoring and promoting public fora to deliver civic education messages, there does not appear to be a specific institutional development guide or plan for the Society that reflects the unique circumstances of Albania. However, this lack of a formalized, explicit plan does not seem to have restrained the development of the Society to date.

There are enormous opportunities for NGOs to contribute to deepening the democratic culture of Albania. Though there was ample evidence that NDI was promoting the development and strengthening NGOs to play a more meaningful role in the emerging civil society of Albania, this dimension of NDI's program lacked structure and focus.

#### **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 8. *Foreign Observers in the Election Process:*** The Country Team should consider asking USAID/Washington to increase the funding for NDI for foreign observers to participate in the coming national election. Consideration should be given to having at a minimum a 24 member observer team. This would allow two observers for each Prefecture. The two observers would be a part of each of the Society's 12 roving teams to be formed for each Prefecture. This recommendation is made in the context of the tense pre-election environment that is currently unfolding. Depending upon the size of the observer delegation, it may be necessary for NDI to think in terms of a full-time logistics coordinator for the period that the delegation is in country to assist the NDI field representative.
- 9. *Civic Education Institutional Model:*** An institutional model and plan should be articulated for the civic education dimension of the Society. NDI should be more explicit in terms of where it is striving to take the Society with the termination of NDI assistance. On which specific part of the civic education objective is the Society going to focus? In view of the fact that many of the leaders in the Society are secondary school teachers, will one of the

major targets for civic education programs be secondary school students? Over the next couple of years what will NDI consider satisfactory interim outcomes?

10. ***Financial Sustainability of the Society and Cost Containment:*** NDI, in conjunction with USAID/Albania and USAID/Washington, should review the economic environment and law that affects the status of NGOs to determine if the Society is able to reduce its dependence on USG funding. A constant concern must be the containment of costs associated with maintaining operations of the Society.
11. ***Society's Name Recognition:*** NDI should help the Society strengthen its name recognition as a non-partisan group. This will not only help in terms of its effectiveness, but it should improve its ability to raise money.
12. ***NGO Development:*** In light of the fact that USAID/Albania is initiating a separate effort to encourage the development and strengthening of NGOs, NDI should consider dropping the efforts it has made to work with NGOs other than the Society. At a minimum, it should coordinate closely with USAID/Albania to be sure these activities are not redundant.
13. ***Records on Women's Participation:*** NDI/Washington and NDI/Albania should maintain records regarding women's participation in the activities that NDI supports. Not only should this include data that identifies women that participate in activities sponsored by NDI and their partner organizations, but it should identify the roles women assume after having received assistance from NDI.
14. ***Transportation Requirements:*** Ample resources should be provided to ensure that the NDI representative can move about Tirana in a vehicle for official business.

## **CHAPTER II: BULGARIA**

### **A. THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI)**

#### **1. BACKGROUND**

IRI's objectives in Bulgaria as stated in the SOW of the evaluation are to:

- # To strengthen political parties at the local level through training focused in effective political outreach, organizational techniques, communication strategies and methods, candidate recruitment, issues identification, and constituency building.
- # To assist local political parties in their non-election year activities and in building strong relationships with their party representatives in parliament.
- # To increase participation of women and young Bulgarians in the political process by strengthening organizations for women and future leaders and establishing political internship programs.

IRI's objectives during the six years of its program in Bulgaria have been adjusted, workplan by workplan, to respond to events on the ground. The objectives noted below are those currently in effect. From the beginning, however, all IRI's objectives in Bulgaria have been based on an assumption that the political structures on the center right, referred to in this report as the democratic opposition, require particular assistance if they are to compete with the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which inherited formidable resources and organizational capacity from the Bulgarian Communist Party.

- # To strengthen political parties at the local level through training in campaign tactics, constituency building, issue identification, candidate recruitment, organizational structure, and communication strategies.
- # To assist the parties of the democratic opposition in selecting a joint candidate for the presidential elections slated for fall 1996.
- # To increase participation of women and youth in the political process.

In pursuit of its objectives IRI has conducted training seminars and conferences, worked both formally and informally with political figures on a local and national level, and made efforts to involve women and youth in its activities. During 1994 to 1996, the period at which this evaluation looks most closely, IRI's assistance has been driven by parliamentary elections (1994), municipal elections (1995), and the upcoming presidential election scheduled for fall 1996.

## **2. FINDINGS**

### **a. Effectiveness of the IRI Resident Representatives and the Political Context in Which They Operate**

As an Evaluation Team, our efforts have been directed mainly at IRI activities since the arrival of the previous IRI representative in early 1994; thus our evaluation of representational effectiveness has two components, the 1994-1995 tenure of in-country representative Scott Mason, and the tenure of the current representatives, Scott Carpenter and Phil Tanis, who arrived in spring 1995.

Scott Mason focused his efforts on local and regional political training by holding more than 80 seminars throughout the country; this program was given practical focus by upcoming parliamentary elections. He also worked with national-level political leaders in an effort to encourage the development of pragmatic, democratic, political formations. During his tenure both IRI and the Country Team operated on the assumption that a “third force” center-right political structure might emerge to provide healthy competition for the largest existing political structure on the right, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Despite its democratic goals and origins, the UDF had proved incapable of broadening its base of support during its brief time in government. It was often immobilized by factional in-fighting and reluctant to devolve power to its local structures. It was also reluctant to move toward an issue-based, positive message, focusing instead on a somewhat dated anti-communist theme.

Scott Mason’s effectiveness must be evaluated within the context of these severe constraints. To some degree, he was able to overcome national-level resistance to the idea of local training, and he was able to carry his efforts to the local political structures, effectively blanketing the country with seminars. His efforts were professional and squarely within the overall objectives of the Country Team. Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify concrete indicators of effectiveness. At the national level, some hard-core UDF leaders were alienated by IRI’s efforts to work with centrist figures, and at the end of 1994, the parliamentary elections were a severe disappointment for the democratic opposition. On balance, our evaluation is that while Scott Mason carried out a professional effort, an intractable political context made measurable impact difficult to achieve.

The political context had begun to change in spring 1995 when the new IRI representatives Scott Carpenter and Phil Tanis arrived. The UDF had begun devolving power to newly created local clubs, and IRI, for the first time, was able to go directly to these clubs to hold training seminars. Changes in the UDF national coordinating council began to shift power toward relatively moderate leaders. The UDF was beginning to show some glimmerings of receptivity to assistance. At the same time, an unlooked-for center-right coalition, the People’s Union, emerged as a viable political force with which the UDF could carry out a working partnership.

Within this improving context, IRI, with the encouragement of USAID, made a good program decision to drop a parliamentary component from its workplan and substituted an intensive 10-city local-political-party training effort. This training effort, given focus by the upcoming municipal elections, allowed the two IRI representatives not only to carry out traditional “road-show”

seminars, but to follow these seminars up with further training and continued personal contact. A number of seminar participants with whom we spoke had been to a regional seminar, then a local seminar, and had then participated in city-specific meetings and strategy sessions. IRI's 10-city program was also given good impetus by having a second in-country representative; IRI was stretched less thin than before and could provide better continuity of contacts. The effect, in several of the cities targeted, was that a number of local leaders actually began implementing their political training, and seeing real results.

Despite a few standout successes, the municipal elections were another setback for the democratic opposition. National-level efforts to field single opposition candidates were marked by bickering and failure which extended down to the local level. Amid the electoral wreckage, however, it was clear that the UDF had survived as a political structure, and that many UDF\*ers were excited about the Starra Zagora model, where intensive IRI efforts had helped the local democratic forces field a single candidate, use door to door campaigning, mobilize young supporters, mount a last-minute voter blitz, and win a hotly contested election. In 1996, IRI's efforts shifted to a new objective--helping the opposition choose a joint candidate for the upcoming presidential elections. To this end the two representatives have been serving as mediators and facilitators, working behind the scenes to help the leaders of the democratic opposition toward an effective primary strategy.

Our overall evaluation is that the two representatives have been effective, both at local training and national mediation. The Starra Zagora success is now seen by many UDF\*ers as a model to be replicated throughout the country. Local political activists give detailed descriptions of seminars and follow-up which are inspiring, pragmatic, and effective. The primary effort, despite much skepticism, has moved forward to the point where it is has a realistic chance of success. Leaders of the main political structures (UDF, People's Union, Movement for Rights and Freedoms) state convincingly that without IRI's help they would never have been able to get this far. The current IRI representatives get high marks for their ability to understand and operate within the complex and often frustrating Bulgarian political context. They are seen as scrupulously even-handed and have avoided accusations that they are trying to pick political winners.

IRI's representatives have worked closely with other political assistance groups and NGOs such as ACCESS and STRATEGNA. Cooperation with the in-country NDI representative was minimal during the tenure of the previous representative. The current IRI representatives had more active communication with NDI representative Lisa McLean until her departure in February, although little active cooperation took place. There has been some coordination with NDI's domestic counterpart organization BAFECR, although this has mainly been an effort to avoid duplication in areas such as get out the vote programs. IRI's reporting and evaluation have been solid and useful. The amount of time the two representatives spend on evaluations, reporting, and bookkeeping averages about 25 to 30 percent, a manageable figure. Support from IRI Washington has been good. The relationship with the Country Team and AID/Sofia has been good since the two current representatives arrived. Prior to this, Mr. Mason had only minimal contacts with AID/Sofia.

## **b. Activities to Strengthen Local Political Parties**

Local political training has been a continuing focus for IRI during the 1994-1996 period. We had difficulty identifying concrete behavioral changes or skills acquired which resulted from the first round of local-level seminars held in 1994; these seminars, nonetheless, introduced new concepts of political campaigning and organizational structures to local activists who had little such experience, and served as a base on which IRI was able to carry out a more intensive 10-city effort in 1995. Most seminars were one- or two-day events; participants were local political leaders and activists. As part of its 10-cities campaign, IRI representatives hammered away at some basic political concepts: door-to-door campaigning, simple and clear messages as opposed to lengthy intellectual platforms, last-minute voter blitzes, and the necessity of uniting behind single candidates. Bulgarians, in general, are unfamiliar with these concepts, and often reluctant to adopt them. In some of the cities where IRI worked, receptivity and implementation were low. In others, however, local political leaders, partly out of desperation, were willing to adopt and use the new techniques. This resulted in a handful of clear successes or near successes. There are now a number of local-level political activists who have put together a grassroots campaign and seen positive results. In effect, a new political model has been not merely introduced, but run successfully. Some leaders at the national level, although by no means all, now understand that model and have the opportunity, if they so desire, to replicate it on a larger scale.

Campaign training materials, developed with the assistance of Bulgarian political activists, have been reproduced and used by Bulgarian trainers at a local level. Follow-on training, particularly when backed up by informal consultation and strategizing, built effectively on earlier efforts and reinforced acquisition of skills. A number of seminar participants cited particularly useful seminar presentations by TDY trainer Tom Mason.

## **c. Activities to Help the Opposition Choose a Single Presidential Candidate**

IRI's operating assumption is that if the democratic opposition fields more than one presidential candidate, the Socialist candidate will win, giving the BSP near total control of Bulgaria's elected institutions. With the strong encouragement of the Ambassador, IRI launched an effort in early 1996 to bring the different parties together to discuss whether and how they might choose a single candidate. IRI provided training and technical information on different selection methods (primaries, caucuses), and held a three-day conference. From this a Working Group has emerged which has carried the process forward. In March, the parties signed an agreement which, if it holds, will allow for an open primary to be held in June.

This is a high-profile and somewhat risky strategy on the part of IRI. Many leaders within the various democratic parties remain nervous about the primary process and doubtful it will play out fairly and to their benefit. A frank estimation of the chances of success at this point is probably about 50/50. If the primary effort is successful, the parties will then have to make a real effort to mobilize their voters. A pro forma endorsement of the joint candidate by the primary "losers" would probably cause the campaign to collapse in mutual recrimination. Even if solidly united behind a single candidate, the opposition will face a tough--although not unwinnable--election. Despite these risks, it is already possible to identify concrete intermediate successes within IRI's primary effort.

A new model of cooperation and self-interested compromise has been launched and has developed its own momentum. Early compromise efforts between formerly bitter rivals have elicited a positive response among voters, which has helped strengthen pro-primary moderates. It must be said that IRI had little choice but to attempt this strategy. Without it, they would have been in the position of helping the individual democratic parties tear one another to shreds.

#### **d. Activities to Increase Participation of Women and Youth in the Political Process**

IRI's efforts to increase political participation by women have largely taken place within the context of the above-described objectives. The IRI representatives have made informal efforts to encourage women's participation in their seminars and training and have tracked that participation, which averages between 25 to 35 percent. There are continuing societal constraints to participation by women in the Bulgarian political process. However, IRI, within the overall context of these constraints, and mainly through informal means, has played a modest role in encouraging greater participation by women.

More concentrated efforts have been made with regard to youth. The UDF and other democratic political groups have created local youth clubs or chapters. IRI has provided specific training and seminars to some of these groups, and engaged in close personal contacts with many youth activists. In some of its target cities, young political activists went door to door in the municipal elections. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these efforts were effective, and perhaps pivotal, in get-out-the-vote efforts. Some criticism has emerged from older political leaders who were unimpressed with, e.g., youth-targeted posters which depended on one's familiarity with deceased American rock star Kurt Cobain. Such criticism, however, seems minor and perhaps inevitable. On the whole, IRI's effort to bring more youth into the political process seems to have had a positive effect.

IRI has not made specific efforts to bring minorities as such into the political process. However, IRI has worked closely with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms party, a mainly ethnic-Turkish formation. Also, in at least one municipality, IRI's training resulted in campaign volunteers going into Roma (Gypsy) neighborhoods to gather support and get out the vote. This is a heretofore unseen experience in Bulgaria.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS**

IRI's program in Bulgaria has been most effective during two key periods: the early days in 1990 and 1991 after the fall of Communism, and more recently during 1995 and 1996. In large part this is a reflection of the overall political environment, and the fluctuating receptivity of the democratic parties; between 1992 and 1995 Bulgaria was, to put it simply, a very tough place to work. Because of the political environment, this was a period when the progress toward achieving IRI's objectives was marginal despite a strong effort on their part. Paradoxically, the democratic opposition seems to have required a several year period of disunity and electoral failure before becoming more open to the practical reforms IRI has been offering all along. There is no guarantee that this new openness will continue. However, IRI, at the moment, is in a good position to strike

while the iron is hot, that is, while relatively pragmatic and receptive political figures are in the ascendance, and the prospect of a presidential election has focused the collective mind of the opposition.

IRI has done a good job choosing its current two representatives, and in focusing their activities on a narrow set of achievable goals. Both representatives, barring a collapse of the primary effort, should be encouraged to stay on through the presidential election campaign. They have credibility, and are in a position to be effective at helping the democratic opposition replicate its practical Starra Zagora success on a broader basis.

The “push-pull” theory described in the Scope of Work has not turned out to be a very good model; in effect, NDI and IRI’s efforts in Bulgaria are separate programs with separate objectives and target audiences. Parliament--the forum in which a push-pull effort would have its most logical coincidence of activity--is, as an institution, among the least tractable of Bulgaria’s political institutions. Barring a new receptivity in parliament, the push-pull model should probably be dropped as a construct for implementing programs and measuring success.

Finally, a comment on the “level the playing field” strategy. Given the relatively unreformed nature of the Bulgarian left, IRI’s decision to work only with the center and right was reasonable and probably inevitable. Even if IRI had wanted to work with the Socialists, such an effort would probably have made it impossible to achieve the trust of the democratic opposition. The BSP, to date, has been relatively muted in its criticism of this policy, choosing not to exploit the possible accusation that an outside power has chosen sides in Bulgaria’s internal politics. This reticence to criticize IRI may well change if the Socialists feel directly threatened in the upcoming elections by a joint opposition candidacy which IRI helped engineer. IRI, as well as the Embassy and USAID, should be prepared for sharper criticism, and should be prepared to make a judgement as to whether that criticism is seriously damaging to IRI, to the democratic opposition it works to support, or to overall U.S. interests in Bulgaria.

#### **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 1. *Maintain Current Objectives and Activities through the Scheduled June Primary:*** In effect, this means helping move the primary effort forward and helping local political structures prepare to implement the Starra Zagora model during the presidential elections.
- 2. *Barring a Serious Collapse of the Primary Effort, Keep Both Representatives In-Country:*** The costs of maintaining Phil Tanis for three to four months beyond his scheduled departure are small compared to the benefit of having him in-country during this crucial period.



## **B. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI)**

### **1. BACKGROUND**

NDI's objectives in Bulgaria as identified in the SOW are:

- # To create a local capacity for election monitoring, voter education, and get-out-the-vote campaigns and create a local advocacy group for free and fair elections.
- # To promote effective dialogue between citizens and elected officials, to encourage citizens to hold parliamentarians and other elected officials accountable for their actions, and for elected officials to be responsive to the concerns of their constituents.
- # To increase citizens' awareness of and involvement in the democratic process by providing information on the various offices and positions within municipal administrations as well as the specific functions, responsibilities, and resources of local government.
- # To assist the BAFECR structure at the national and local levels to design and implement activities that involve a wide range of citizens who can demonstrate to elected Bulgarian politicians the importance of and ways to respond to the concerns of the citizens they represent.

### **2. FINDINGS**

#### **a. Election Monitoring**

The objective of creating and institutionalizing election monitoring capacity as a cornerstone of the electoral process in Bulgaria has been accomplished. The Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights (BAFECR) is recognized as an indigenous, private, volunteer, non-partisan and technically competent institution that has sustained an excellent performance from its first activity (1990 June elections) to today. BAFECR has had a major impact in helping ordinary citizens have faith in the legitimacy of the electoral process. NDI's contribution to the institutionalization of BAFECR has been critical, timely and highly satisfactory. BAFECR core activities, which constitute the components of an election monitoring system, are:

- # Identifying a number of young students willing to establish an organization to monitor the June 1990 elections in the hopes that a domestic monitoring effort would promote citizen confidence in the electoral process;
- # Creating a national organization with regional centers located throughout Bulgaria and recruiting thousands of volunteers to be present at polling sites throughout the country and to conduct an accurate independent vote tabulation;
- # Designing and undertaking pre-election training programs and efforts to distribute information about election procedures. This has not only promoted confidence and

participation in the elections but boosted public confidence in, and awareness of, the potential for citizen participation in the democratic process;

- # Familiarizing volunteers and the citizenry with election law and procedures. This includes preparing and distributing civic education materials in print and through broadcast media;
- # Assessing the quality of draft electoral laws; identifying administrative impediments to free and fair elections; evaluating political implications of electoral laws in Bulgaria at the outset of the election campaign; and determining which issues regarding electoral laws might require further investigation;
- # Producing timely, non-partisan and independent confirmation of election results and well-documented reporting of the election events.

BAFECR has played a paramount role on the Bulgarian election scene by conducting voter education campaigns, monitoring the electoral process and building citizen confidence in this process. BAFECR has recruited and trained over 10,000 Bulgarian citizens to participate in non-partisan monitoring roles in the electoral process. As a consequence, individual citizens have taken an active role in enforcing democratic norms that have assisted Bulgaria in pursuing a democratic path with "rules of the game" that stand in stark contrast to the period before 1990.

#### **b. Civic Education**

Since the outset of NDI's work with BAFECR, an objective has been to reach broad segments of the population with a civic education program. In March 1994, NDI placed a full-time field representative in Bulgaria. Lisa McLean, who had worked on NDI's programs in Bulgaria since their inception, was assigned to work with BAFECR to improve the effectiveness of its educational activities, especially in the non-electoral field. In addition, Ms. McLean, working through BAFECR, helped other NGOs increase their capacity to inform citizens about the functions of government and to encourage citizen participation in the governance process. Since that time, BAFECR has focused on themes concerned with strengthening local government and enhancing citizen participation in local government. Community fora, in which hundreds of citizens participated focused on identifying the most pressing problems at the local level and were undertaken throughout Bulgaria in CY 1995. An example of BAFECR's efforts in this area is seen in its publication, The Citizens and Local Authorities.

#### **c. BAFECR Organizational Capacity**

Through the activities financed by its Cooperative Agreement with NDI, BAFECR has developed a solid institutional foundation and has established itself as an important contributor to the democratization process in Bulgaria. BAFECR's civic education activities, particularly related to the electoral process, have significantly contributed to encouraging citizen participation in the electoral process and ensured that election results have been regularly accepted by the general citizenry. BAFECR serves as a model organization for similar NGOs in other countries, and its staff has visited other countries as trainers and observers.

BAFECR has created an outreach mechanism that has 25 Regional Offices that interface with the 55 local clubs located throughout Bulgaria. The Regional Offices receive support for rent, heating, electricity and telephone charges. These offices have usually been provided with office furniture, a fax machine, a copying machine and a part-time secretary. In an effort to decentralize decision making, the Regional Offices are attempting to become the programming and implementation heart of BAFECR. The Regional Office is managed by a Regional Director who is elected by BAFECR members from the local clubs. The Regional Director is also a member of the national Program Committee that provides direction to the Executive Director of BAFECR.

BAFECR has developed international and domestic funding to support a number of democracy and governance activities. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the National Endowment for Democracy have funded the establishment of a network of six Civic Centers co-located with BAFECR Regional Offices around the country whose purpose is providing information to citizens to encourage citizens to mobilize and address their problems at the community level.

#### **d. Financial Sustainability of BAFECR**

Presently it is estimated that the minimum annual operational costs for sustaining BAFECR are \$76,000. Recently, BAFECR has moved its headquarters to a more modest office to conserve costs. Despite efforts on the part of BAFECR to seek alternative sources of funding to cover these basic overhead costs, BAFECR has been able to attract alternative financial support for only a handful of special programs. The present economic scene in Bulgaria and the legal framework for NGOs makes it virtually impossible for BAFECR to raise sufficient funds to cover its operating costs. In the short term, two to three years, prospects for fund raising are not expected to improve dramatically. This does not mean to suggest that BAFECR should reduce its fund raising efforts, but it is important to have realistic expectations as to what can be expected from these efforts.

#### **e. NDI Performance**

NDI has been concerned with all aspects of BAFECR's development as an independent NGO. By necessity NDI has been directly involved with BAFECR's mission identification and articulation, volunteer recruitment, infrastructure development, staff development, and program development, refinement and implementation for both election monitoring and civic education activities. Initially the NDI input was mobilized through frequent short term training and technical assistance missions.

In 1994 NDI placed a full-time field representative, Lisa McLean, in Sofia to assist BAFECR to streamline its administrative structure and increase its civic education activities. With Ms. McLean's assistance BAFECR framed by-laws and developed administrative and financial standards which are codified. A newsletter was developed which has significantly contributed to increasing public awareness of BAFECR activities and providing information to volunteers and activists about BAFECR's local and national activities. At the suggestion of NDI, a National Program Council was incorporated in the by-laws of May 1994 which has facilitated program coordination between the National Headquarters, the Regional Offices and the clubs.

In sum, NDI has been an excellent partner in the successful institutionalization of BAFECR.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS**

BAFECR has enhanced citizen confidence in the election process. BAFECR has motivated thousands of volunteer activists to monitor and report on both national and local elections. This type of consistency has raised BAFECR's standing as a reliable source of information and has lent an air of credibility to BAFECR that few organizations in the region have achieved.

NDI has made timely and valuable contributions that have directly resulted in capacity building of BAFECR in terms of its organizational structure, its management practices, and civic education programming capacity. Though there is no longer a NDI resident representative, NDI/Washington is in close contact with BAFECR leadership providing technical inputs at critical junctures. It continues to be concerned with all aspects of BAFECR's operations, particularly its fund raising efforts in BAFECR's drive to become independent of USG funding.

Substantial progress has been made in developing a civic education program that promotes a dialogue between citizens and local government officials. However, in the absence of specific criteria, it is extremely difficult to assess the impact of the civic education component of BAFECR. Though thousands of Bulgarians have taken part in fora held throughout Bulgaria that were concerned with promoting citizen participation in local government, does this represent a satisfactory level impact to justify continued USAID support for BAFECR? What outcomes should NDI collect data for over the next couple of years to gauge the performance of BAFECR's civic education component? Support for BAFECR's civic education component, as long as it is modestly priced, has been accepted as an article of faith. But, in a climate of scarcity of resources, the type of institutional investments that BAFECR represents must be curtailed. In the meantime, an effort must be made to identify outcomes that can be used by NDI and USAID as it makes decisions regarding follow-on support. The same could also be said for USAID support for the Society in Albania.

A major concern is the recurring costs necessary to sustain the BAFECR operation. BAFECR's outreach mechanism with 25 Regional Offices to interface with 55 local clubs may not be the most efficient solution to address the desire on one hand to decentralize decision-making in BAFECR and on the other hand to seek least-cost solutions as BAFECR strives to break its dependency on USG funding.

The size and organizational capacity of BAFECR make it an extremely attractive target of politicians desirous of expanding their political base. We heard a number of reports that the former Executive Director, and at least one other individual, were claiming that BAFECR could be converted to a centrist political organization. This seems unlikely given the genuinely non-partisan preferences of most BAFECR members, but even the perception of partisan behavior could be damaging to BAFECR's reputation and effectiveness.

### **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

3. ***Financial Sustainability of BAFECR and Cost Containment:*** Every six months NDI, in conjunction with USAID/Bulgaria and USAID/Washington should review the economic environment and the law that affects the status of NGOs to determine if BAFECR is able to reduce its dependence on USG funding. A constant concern must be the containment of costs associated with maintaining operations of the BAFECR.
4. ***The Outreach Mechanism of BAFECR:*** Every effort must be made to ensure that the structure of the BAFECR's outreach mechanism balances two key concerns--decentralization of decision-making in BAFECR and a least-cost solution. Some cost savings could be achieved by closing some regional offices. However, the bulk of BAFECR's operational costs come from phone bills and salaries for its headquarters staff.
5. ***Drop or suspend the “push-pull” model of cooperation between IRI and NDI:*** There may be areas in which the two institutes can and should cooperate, but the push-pull model is simply not accurate to current activates or objectives in Bulgaria.
6. ***Non-partisan Character of BAFECR:*** NDI should closely monitor BAFECR's operations from the standpoint of BAFECR maintaining their non-partisan status.

## **CHAPTER III: UKRAINE**

### **A. THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI)**

#### **1. BACKGROUND**

IRI, since 1994, has developed and pursued the following objectives in Ukraine:

- # To strengthen and develop political parties and coalitions, particularly at the local level, in order to help establish a broader and firmer base for democratic participation;
- # To enhance the ability of local political activists and parties to build coalitions and to aid in identifying and training viable candidates and campaign workers;
- # To work with factions of the parliament on constituency outreach and coalition building.

Most of IRI's activities in 1995 and 1996 have been devoted to the first two objectives, with the third objective making up less than 10 percent of its program. In 1993 and 1994, IRI's activities were driven by elections, and included election-monitoring training. To achieve its current objectives, IRI conducts seminars at the grassroots level with a focus on party organization and development, campaign organization and practices, media and communications, and coalition building. Training is concentrated in six oblast (state) capitals: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odessa, Cherkasy, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil.

#### **2. FINDINGS**

##### **a. Activities to Strengthen Political Parties**

IRI's tight focus on six cities allows for an intensive training effort, with regular repeat visits and a logical progression of follow-on training. In 1995, the program carried out seminars on basic political party skills, followed by a second round of seminars aimed at activists from the areas surrounding the target cities. In some cases IRI helped pay transportation costs for these participants. Seminars in the first half of 1996 have emphasized coalition building, leadership skills and training-of-trainers. IRI has developed working relationships with activists and elected leaders in its six cities; these ongoing relationships help its productivity. IRI intends to add three cities to its efforts in 1996, which means that about two thirds of the major population centers in Ukraine will be receiving political party training from either IRI or NDI.

We attended a coalition-building seminar in Ternopil. The presentation blended formal presentations by American and Ukrainian experts with role-playing exercises that encouraged participants from different political parties to seek common solutions in addressing problems. The seminar reflected a well-executed training system that follows a clear cycle of components: development of the curriculum; the presentation itself; evaluation of the training by participants and the IRI team as a prelude to the design of the next training effort; and the presentation of the next activity. As noted, volunteer trainers from the U.S., complemented by Ukrainian trainers, play a key

role in IRI's seminars. Resident IRI representative Tom Garrett recognizes the possible downside of volunteer trainers who may not understand the Ukrainian context; trainers are well briefed before their presentations, and IRI staff members are on hand to step in and correct the mistakes that are made. Efforts are made to select American volunteers whose experience is comparable to that of their Ukrainian counterparts, e.g., local-level activists who have built coalitions on shoestring budgets rather than high-powered national-level consultants. We note, however, that there is little involvement by IRI's field staff in the selection of volunteer trainers.

IRI's written materials are comprehensive and cover a range of political and party-building skills. The program makes deliberate efforts to have a multiplier effect around its target cities, encouraging parties to hold their own training activities and provide written materials. IRI has not made it a key objective to involve women and youth, but there is significant youth involvement within the political parties--including a number of youth auxiliaries--and a youth conference is planned for this year. A number of young political activists who received training through the Association of Young Ukrainian Politicians have been parliamentary staffers. IRI has developed a benchmark questionnaire with which to measure change over time in the parties with which it works, but does not appear to have done much in terms of evaluating the information received on these questionnaires.

Overall, IRI's political party development program in Ukraine is particularly well organized and tightly focused. We were especially impressed with the effective use of Ukrainian trainers within the training activities. This program is making good progress toward accomplishing its objective of strengthening, at a local level, the 10 to 15 parties with which it works. However, it must be noted that Ukraine faces enormous obstacles in transforming its political system, and the parties with which IRI works represent only a small part of the electorate. Change, in Ukraine, is likely to come hard and slow, and the efforts of both IRI and NDI must be seen as activities which will pay off only over time. Success will have to be measured in modest changes in behavior and skills acquired among the group of target parties rather than dramatic election success.

#### **b. Activities to Help Local Political Activists and Parties Build Coalitions**

Ukraine's political center is occupied by fractious and splintered parties with uneven regional representation; thus coalition-building is an obvious need. IRI's seminars specifically targeting this area began in 1996, although coalition-building has been an ongoing element in its training events and informal consultations. Coalitions were created in two of IRI's six cities in 1995 to contest parliamentary by-elections. While neither won, they made a respectable showing, and in early 1996 a third coalition emerged in another target city. We met with members of a coalition in Cherkasy and found it to be an impressive group. Members understood and were practicing basic coalition skills and had high praise for the catalytic role IRI had played in helping them come together. The woman who ran as the coalition's parliamentary by-election candidate, a member of one of the smaller parties, noted that the coalition's surprisingly strong election performance had forced local power structures to take them more seriously, and was putting pressure on national-level political party leaders to begin forming coalitions as well.

**c. Activities To Help Parliament With Constituency Outreach & Coalition Building**

Ukraine's parliament is dominated by Communists, former Communists, and a block of status-quo-protecting MPs who have little interest in reform. Party affiliation is almost irrelevant, with parliamentary factions forming instead around issues, personalities, historical affiliation, and self-interest. Many MPs are not receptive to acquiring basic democratic parliamentary skills or to conducting outreach activities. Against this difficult environment, IRI has conducted four parliamentary training seminars since late 1994 on coalition building, communication, and staff training. We were not able to see a parliamentary training effort, and found it difficult to identify skills acquired or changes in behavior, although this is not surprising for a relatively intermittent program. We note further that NDI has a parliamentary specialist who spends the majority of his time working with parliament. Given these realities, we think IRI should either drop parliamentary efforts or bring on another staff member to carry out a more sustained effort.

**d. Effectiveness of the IRI Resident Representatives**

Resident Program Director Tom Garrett began work in Ukraine at the beginning of 1995. Since IRI's Ukraine program relies heavily on visiting American trainers and Ukrainian trainers, much of Mr. Garrett's work is administrative in nature, although he also conducts some training activities. For scheduling reasons we were unable to watch him conduct a seminar, but the program he directs is well organized and well focused in its objectives, with the exception of the parliamentary component which has received intermittent attention. Given IRI's relatively small staff, and the considerable administrative burden imposed by using visiting trainers, the frequency of seminars suggests high productivity. Mr. Garrett's relationships with Ukrainian staff members are good, and these staff members are well-educated and effective; there is a genuine sense that IRI's Ukrainian employees are partners and that the office works as an integrated team. Resident Program Officer Chris Holzen, who arrived in late 1995, serves mainly as a seminar coordinator. The seminar we watched him hold in Ternopil was well organized and crisply run.

The office receives good support from IRI headquarters, although we identified some problems with the selection of visiting trainers. Mr. Garrett spends about 25 percent of his time writing reports and handling financial work. Contacts with NDI are informal and take place probably once a week, enough to allow the two institutes--which have a geographical division of labor--to avoid overlap. IRI and NDI worked together on a get-out-the-vote by-election effort at the end of 1995. The relationship with USAID/Ukraine is good, although it could be closer. There has been some tension in the Embassy relationship, a situation which should be rectified. IRI maintains a productive relationship with a number of NGOs including the Association of Young Ukrainian Politicians, an impressive non-partisan group which is active both in Kiev and outside the capital.

**3. CONCLUSIONS**

Ukraine's political environment is an extremely difficult one in which to work. Beyond the obstructionist nature of parliament, most Ukrainians feel a deeply-ingrained suspicion toward the political process as a whole. This feeling has been intensified by the failure of political leaders to



implement meaningful reforms, and by a series of pointless by-elections. IRI's response to this difficult political situation has been to direct its efforts almost exclusively at the local level, and to focus those efforts in a manageable number of cities, so as to have an identifiable--albeit modest--effect. This has been the right approach and should be continued. IRI's training activities are well executed, and, if judged by the evaluations provided by the participants, are having significant impact. However, there are no objective criteria in place to judge the success of IRI training efforts in creating and strengthening political party infrastructure at the grassroots level.

IRI makes a reasonable case for its decision to work with only those parties at the relatively narrow center of the political spectrum which it views as reform-minded and democratic. It argues that parties to the left are unreformed Communists, and parties to the right are not merely nationalist, but anti-Western, and probably uninterested in what IRI has to offer. This approach has not created a backlash or negative feeling among Ukrainians. However, it has caused some difficulties with the Embassy, which argues that IRI's exclusionary approach causes it to miss the basic power structures in society. The tension arising from these differing points of view may be unavoidable and part of Ukraine's long transition away from Communism; IRI is doing development work, which must be tightly focused to be successful, while the Embassy must work with the powers that be--no matter how odious--and hope those powers are capable of reform.

A basic assumption on which IRI operates is that Ukraine will eventually move toward a healthier and more "normal" political system. A new constitution and a new electoral law, both currently under consideration, should improve the situation by strengthening the role of political parties. However, USAID should bear in mind that IRI's work in Ukraine will be a longer-term effort than in Albania, Bulgaria or Lithuania.

#### **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. ***Focus on the Local Level:*** Maintain a primary focus at the local level, but balance this with some national-level political party work. As the health of the political system improves, national level party leaders will become more important and will benefit from training and consultation.
2. ***Drop Parliamentary assistance as an Objective:*** As noted, NDI already has a nearly-full-time person working with parliament. IRI's limited resources are best devoted to its first two objectives, unless it chooses to add staff. If so, it should coordinate closely with NDI to avoid redundancy.
3. ***Measuring Performance from a Baseline:*** A questionnaire should be developed to be filled out by each local party chairman to determine the status of political party development for those parties taking part in the IRI training in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odessa, Cherkasy, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil. The questionnaire would serve as the baseline against which to measure change in those areas that IRI has promoted in their training. An approach that could be helpful is reflected in the instruments being developed by IRI in Lithuania to establish a baseline and to identify changes in the future.

4. ***Involve IRI Field Staff in the Selection of Visiting Trainers:*** While trainers on the whole seemed to be good and effective, the program would benefit if IRI/Washington were to involve its field officers more directly in the selection process, and continue its efforts to persuade those trainers who are most effective, as judged by the field staff, to return for repeat sessions.
5. ***Regular Meetings with the Country Team:*** Set up regular meetings between IRI, NDI, USAID and an Embassy political officer. Periodic and regular meetings would not necessarily eliminate Embassy-IRI tensions but would certainly improve understanding. Some of this tension, in our view, is based simply on misreading of the other\*s position.

## **B. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI)**

### **1. BACKGROUND**

NDI is currently pursuing the following objectives in Ukraine:

- # To work with existing parties at the national level to strengthen their capacities for outreach, platform development, public opinion research, grassroots organization, fundraising, and media relations;
- # To work with democratically-oriented factions of the parliament on constituency outreach and coalition building;
- # To assist issue-oriented civic organizations and work to promote citizen participation and advocacy;
- # To work with democratic mayors and local councils to define and understand their roles and responsibilities as legislators, politicians, and representatives, and to help them to improve links between local and federal authorities.

NDI works with reform-oriented parties at the national and local level. It also conducts seminars which bring together local officials, party leaders, civic activists, business people and journalists to discuss democratic procedures. In addition, NDI has programs designed to foster constituency outreach and legislative activities in the parliament; to promote NGO development including the creation of an election-monitoring and civic-education organization; and to involve greater citizen participation in local government. NDI has been working in Ukraine since 1992. Its activities from 1992-1994 were driven mainly by the municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections which took place in 1994. Since then it has pursued the off-election-year activities described above.

## **2. FINDINGS**

### **a. Political Party Development**

NDI's work with political parties has evolved since 1995 from a focus on national-level parties to a focus on the oblast (state) and local level. This is an appropriate shift, since "national level" parties in Ukraine are frequently less-than-national in nature and less than responsive to training efforts. We were able to identify concrete success with at least one national-level party which convincingly described how it had opened itself to new members, changed internal structures, and begun direct contact with voters. We also heard good evaluations of NDI's political party work at the local level, although these comments were fairly dated, since NDI has moved away from this sort of nuts-and-bolts political training.

NDI has made effective--although not consistent--use of Ukrainian trainers and visiting trainers from the US and other countries. A number of participants in NDI seminars have gone on to influential positions in parliament or the government. NDI has also carried out special training and consultation for individual democratically-oriented parties such as Rukh; these efforts appear to have been effective, and should continue. Also, NDI's efforts to strengthen links between oblast/local party structures and national-level structures appear to be appropriate, although it is difficult to measure effectiveness in this area. Overall, our view is that NDI is currently moving toward the right balance between local and national level training efforts.

In our view, however, NDI's political party training effort has suffered from a lack of resources and focus during the last two years. Ms. Tausner, the main political party trainer, manages a sizeable office and is able to devote barely 50 percent of her time to actual training events. Mr. Bradley, the other political party trainer, puts most of his efforts into parliament. NDI in 1996 has chosen five cities in which to work, but several of these are different than their 1995 target cities, which has made consistency and follow-up difficult. The subject matter of training seminars has moved away from core political party training--at which NDI demonstrated excellent effectiveness in 1992-1993--to focus on media, and on building "constructive relationships" between such diverse players as journalists, local officials, party activists, and NGOs.

We also note that NDI has not established an effective set of objective criteria with which to measure the success of its political party development in Ukraine. However, in the course of the evaluation, a number of indicators were identified to point out possible linkages between NDI training efforts and actual changes in party organization and development, and campaign practices. These indicators include: youth membership, internal organization, platform development, fund-raising capacity, media and communications capacity, coalition building, and relations between national parties and their grassroots structures.

### **b. Work With Parliament**

Ukrainian parliamentarians are grouped mainly by faction rather than political party; thus NDI has worked not with parties, but factions. Mr. Bradley spends about 60 percent of his time working with deputies and their staffers in an effort to improve faction communication, constituency

outreach, legislative agenda-building, coalition-building, and institutional capacity. Because the balance of power in Ukraine's parliament remains with the hard-core left and those who have an interest in preserving the status quo, it is difficult to point to dramatic changes in behavior among parliamentarians.

There is evidence, however, that some factions are doing a better job of working in coalition, communicating internally, and reaching out to constituents. Individual deputies described better links between staffers and civic organizations in their home districts. A special training program for one reform-minded faction appears to have helped it become more organized and cohesive; similar programs are planned for several other groups. Factions on the center-right were able to work together recently to block an undemocratic constitutional draft put forward by the Communists.

Over time, changes in legislation and the overall political climate should create incentives for existing factions to be more reform-oriented, and for parties to play a stronger role in the legislative arena. NDI's parliamentary work must be viewed as a long-term effort, but is unquestionably worth undertaking, given the crucial role the parliament--for better or worse--will play in shaping policies that impact every other realm in Ukrainian public life.

### **c. NGO Development and the Committee of Voters of Ukraine**

A critical component of NDI's work in Ukraine has been to foster the creation and strengthening of issue-oriented, civic organizations that encourage broad citizen participation. In pursuit of this objective, NDI has conducted a series of workshops in Kiev, Poltava, Lviv, Uzhorod, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Yalta, and Gorlovka touching nearly 300 leaders representing over 100 private voluntary associations. The seminars have been concerned with a variety of subjects to strengthen capacity in the areas of fund raising, media, organizational structure and membership.

Many of the organizations that have benefitted from training provided by NDI are mobilizing and sustaining support at both the national and local levels for political, economic, and social issues basic to deepening the civic culture of Ukraine. One such organization is the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU). In Ukraine's first democratic parliamentary elections, the CVU mobilized over 4,000 volunteers to monitor polling activities. Subsequently, in preparation for the December 1995 parliamentary bi-elections, the CVU held training sessions on monitoring for new volunteers and succeeded in getting enough volunteers to cover 30 of the 45 Districts which still had vacant seats.

Presently the CVU has representation in 22 of Ukraine's 25 oblasts and city branches in Kiev and Sevastopol. These incipient organizations are promoting a variety of activities including holding town meetings, conducting informational seminars on the current draft of the election law, and organizing volunteers for up-coming parliamentary bi-elections. The national structure of the CVU has recently been redefined and the national office has been reorganized to professionalize its operations. Currently, the CVU's bylaws are being revised, a statement of mission and strategy is being developed, and a Cooperative Agreement with NDI is being drafted.

In numerous conversations with political leaders throughout Ukraine skepticism was expressed regarding the utility of an election monitoring organization like the CVU. Politicians were

wary of the ability of any group maintaining a bi-partisan character. These same politicians also felt that it was the role of the political party to monitor elections. None of the politicians encountered knew of the existence of the CVU. While this can be explained in part by the fact that the CVU was forced to change its name in order to register as an NGO, the organization nonetheless has very little name recognition, which hampers its effectiveness.

#### **d. Local Government**

NDI is initiating a local government activity in Lviv designed to promote greater citizen participation in the municipal planning process. A quarter-time trainer, Wallace Rogers, has been working with the Lviv mayor, who is enthusiastic about the assistance. However, we note that Research Triangle Institute (RTI) which is funded by USAID, has a full-time advisor who has been resident in Lviv for some time working with the municipality on a range of issues which include enhanced citizen participation in local government.

This raises the obvious question as to whether NDI's plan duplicates efforts already underway by RTI. According to NDI staffers in Kiev, Mr. Rogers has not met with his RTI colleague, and we could find no evidence that NDI has made an evaluation of how the two advisors might work in a complementary rather than redundant fashion. NDI staffers in Kiev knew little about the RTI program in Lviv, and appear to have relied upon the mayor for assurances that their trainer would not be overlapping RTI activities.

NDI has carried out a round of seminars which bring together businessmen, local deputies, party leaders, and civic activists with the idea of improving democratic cooperation at the local level. We were not able to identify concrete impact from these seminars, nor were we able to answer the question to our satisfaction as to whether the fairly generalized goals of the seminars--and the broad range of participants--were too diffuse to produce concrete results.

#### **e. Effectiveness of the NDI Resident Representatives**

NDI Ukraine has a sizeable American/Canadian staff, with three resident trainers, three resident program assistants, and two part-time non-resident trainers. We were unable for scheduling reasons to observe any NDI training activities or seminars, so our evaluation is based on conversations with seminar participants and with the trainers themselves. Former resident trainers Daniel Ebert (political party training) and Ross Reid (parliament and political party training) received consistently high marks from seminar participants for their ability to run productive seminars and motivate participants. We spent the better part of a day with civic organization trainer Katie Fox and her primary NGO counterpart, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU). Ms. Fox has clearly established a solid and useful working relationship with the CVU, and has struck a proper balance between hands-on guidance and allowing the CVU to develop its own decision-making capabilities. Owing to the relatively recent arrival of Diane Tausner (Mr. Ebert's replacement) and Fred Bradley (Mr. Reid's replacement), and owing to the absence of organized seminar evaluation materials, we had little basis to evaluate their performance. We note that NDI has now hired a full-time office manager, which will allow Ms. Tausner to devote herself fully to political-party training; we laud this move.

The staff overall is highly motivated, hard-working, and receives adequate support from NDI/Washington. Good long-term working relationships with Ukrainian counterparts (NGO\*s, deputies, party activists, local officials, Ukrainian trainers) enhance the program\*s effectiveness and sustainability. Contacts with IRI are informal and take place probably once a week, enough to allow the two institutes--which have a geographical division of labor--to avoid overlap. The relationship with USAID is reasonably good, although it could be closer. The relationship with Embassy personnel is also good, with fairly regular informal meetings and exchanges of information. The amount of time spent on administrative/financial/reporting duties varies by trainer. Ms. Tausner, who is acting office manager, spends 25 percent or more of her time on such duties, compared to 15 to 20 percent on the part of Ms. Fox and Mr. Bradley. The three program assistants take a good deal of the administrative burden off the trainers themselves.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

NDI\*s **parliamentary effort** seems to be reasonably well organized and on track, although we were not able to see a training event.

With regard to **political party training**--and a range of other training efforts at the local level--we note that over the last three years NDI\*s objectives, activities, and target cities have undergone almost continual change. While it is laudable to have program flexibility and ambitious objectives, an effective program must also have a degree of consistency and focus to achieve results. Simply put, we think NDI has been trying to do too much in too many different realms. Much of its ambitious program is based on the idea that a diverse range of efforts will have a synergistic effect, but we were unable to see much evidence of this. Instead, we saw a dilution of impact, and a blurring of the line between what are admittedly genuine needs and IRI\*s ability to address those needs.

NDI is currently engaged with the **CVU** in core institution building tasks that will set the nature and scope of CVU's operations into the 21st Century. Such basic questions will need to be constantly addressed as to the nature of financial support, managerial guidance, and intellectual direction that the national headquarters will provide to CVU organizations at the oblast and city levels. Least cost solutions must always be pursued when designing the outreach infrastructure that the national headquarters is seeking to implement. As a consequence, the drafting of the Cooperative Agreement and the bylaws as well as a new vision statement that will impact the mission and strategy of the CVU are activities that must be approached by NDI with great care. This being said, in our conversations with the NDI residential leadership, the NDI advisors reflected a sure-footed capacity to address these institutional issues in partnership with CVU leadership.

A number of the young activists in the **CVU** expressed such keen interest in the political process that it should be anticipated that without constant vigilance, it could be easy for some of these individuals to slip over the line between political activism and non-partisanship.

The lack of awareness on the part of political leadership of the role of the **CVU** may reflect that the organization is new and only recently changed its name. However, NDI should continually

test its assumption that there is space in the institutional landscape for a civic education institution that performs election monitoring.

With regard to NDI's **local government** initiative, our view is that having two advisors working in the same city must be presumed to be redundant unless close coordination has been undertaken between the two grantees, and the "latecomer" grantee--NDI in this case--has made a convincing and well-researched justification for doubling-up scarce resources. NDI has not made a convincing justification for its program in Lviv.

#### **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 6. *Refocus Local Training Efforts:*** NDI should refocus its efforts on transmitting nuts-and-bolts political party skills such as organizational structure, coalition building, message development, outreach, and candidate selection. It should stay with its current group of five cities for the foreseeable future, eventually expanding to three or four more cities. It should return regularly to these cities to strengthen basic skills, make systematic efforts at bringing in activists from smaller cities and towns surrounding the target cities, and develop a train-the-trainers effort. This would not only broaden the training impact, but strengthen structural links within parties. NDI should also consider bringing in more trainers, perhaps on a volunteer basis to conserve resources, from the United States and other countries, as it has done in the past. With three program assistants on staff, the extra administrative burden would not be unmanageable, and the program would be enriched. Finally, NDI may wish to consider attaching a Ukrainian trainer to its staff; there are currently no Ukrainian "substance" people in the office.
- 7. *Redirect or Drop the Local Government Activity in Lviv:*** Given scarce resources, and the large number of municipalities which need assistance, the present situation in which both RTI and NDI are working in Lviv makes little sense. NDI should target its assistance on another city, or drop the effort entirely.
- 8. *Strengthen the CVU:*** Help the Committee of Voters of Ukraine develop low-cost ways to maintain its operations and build better name recognition. A more recognizable "brand name" for the CVU will not only allow it to be more effective in upcoming elections, but will enhance its ability to begin raising funds and eventually become self-supporting.
- 9. *Discontinue Media Activity:*** Discontinue efforts aimed directly at the media. We view these seminars, which often focus on relatively academic themes such as "ethics in journalism," as unlikely to have concrete impact. Media efforts should be reduced and folded as sub-components back into political party and NGO training activities.
- 10. *Monitoring Plan for Political Party Development Work:*** NDI should develop and install a monitoring plan for its program designed to strengthen political party development at the grassroots level. The monitoring plan should contain the following basic elements which could be identified in the workplan:

- # Outcomes or objectives that can reasonably be achieved;
- # Indicators to identify if the outcomes have been in fact achieved;
- # A baseline against which to measure performance;
- # A mechanism for gathering the indicator data that will be compared with the baseline data;
- # Systematic evaluation of training activities including the performance of the trainers.

## C. WORKPLANS AND REPORTING

### 1. FINDINGS

NDI and IRI prepare six month workplans and report semi-annually on progress. When the situation was reviewed regarding NDI's workplan, it was learned that NDI was three months into the implementation of a current workplan for which it had yet to receive approval. It was also reported both by NDI and IRI field-based personnel, as well as resident USAID personnel, that the six month progress reports were not particularly useful management tools. IRI, NDI, and USAID field-based personnel felt that they were not in the communications loop when it came to the current reporting arrangements. When the report did arrive, it had lost its usefulness because of its lack of timeliness. It was also discerned by the Evaluation Team that the six-month reporting system was not particularly useful to Washington-based USAID personnel. Washington-based NDI and IRI personnel expressed a concern that they received very little feed-back on their semi-annual progress reports.

### 2. CONCLUSIONS

The time horizon of six months for a workplan appears too short, particularly considering the number of bureaucratic actions required to obtain approval for the workplan. Additionally, field-based personnel of USAID, IRI, and NDI would benefit from the exchange of project performance information on a more timely basis. This information could form the basis for meetings between USAID and IRI and NDI officers that could lead to increasing the awareness of the performance of these activities and how the implementation of these activities might be modified so as to increase their effectiveness.

### 3. RECOMMENDATION

11. ***Workplan, Reporting and Meeting Requirements:*** Consideration should be given to installing an annual workplan requirement with quarterly progress reporting. Consideration should also be given to having NDI and IRI progress reporting, be it semi-annual or quarterly, made directly available to USAID/Ukraine. The reporting could form the basis for a formal review by USAID/Ukraine and NDI or IRI of progress and implementation problems that impede activity progress.



## **CHAPTER IV: LITHUANIA**

### **A. THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI)**

#### **1. BACKGROUND**

IRI has developed and pursued the following main objectives in Lithuania:

- # To strengthen Lithuania's political parties at the local level;
- # To provide organizational models and strategies which can be replicated throughout the country by local activists thereby reaching a larger grassroots audience; and,
- # To provide a practical arena to reinforce training topics from the local training seminars and regional conferences.

To achieve these objectives, IRI has held political party training seminars in all the major cities outside the capital, largely blanketing this country of 3.7 million people. Its activities have been open to all political parties, many of which have participated to a greater or lesser degree. IRI's efforts in 1994 and 1995 were given focus by the 1995 municipal elections, which saw electoral gains in many cities and towns for parties on the center and right. IRI's activities for 1996 have been driven by upcoming parliamentary elections to be held in October. The next round of municipal elections, scheduled for spring 1997, will be followed by presidential elections in early 1998.

The three objectives above are taken directly from the Scope of Work. Objectives two and three are vague elaborations of objective one; thus we have not treated them separately in the Findings section. We note, however, that one of the recommendations we make below--that IRI develop an intensive train-the-trainers program after the October 1996 parliamentary elections--would fall most logically, as an activity, under the third objective.

#### **2. FINDINGS**

##### **a. Activities to Strengthen Lithuania's Political Parties at the Local Level**

IRI's former in-country representative, Christopher Shields, held ten training seminars (eight local, two regional) during his fifteen month tenure. The seminars focused on campaign management, coalition-building, voter turnout, message development, and media relations. After municipal elections in March 1995, seminars shifted to an off-election-year emphasis on party organization. Seminar programs rely heavily on role-playing to bring home the practicality of the theoretical material presented. Most training activities are carried out by the resident representative, although volunteer trainers from the United States were used to a limited extent.

IRI's training activities have shown a good progression from relatively broad coverage in FY 1995, which introduced basic campaign and party skills to a large number of local activists, to a more intensive effort in FY 1996, which will build on and help implement those skills. The first

round of seminars in FY 1996 emphasized candidate selection skills. A second round will focus on campaign skills, communications, fund raising, and outreach, and will include a return visit to consult with local party leaders. In the third round leading up to the parliamentary elections, Mr. Grabauskas will work directly with candidates, helping them prepare for the possibility they may win and take office. The intensive nature of these training activities, and the tight focus on six cities, suggests that IRI's program for FY 1996 will correct what we saw as a weakness in the previous year--that some cities received no follow-up attention, either formal or informal, after the seminar. For example, there was virtually no contact with Kaunas, the second largest city, for almost 18 months after the seminar held there in September 1994.

As noted, all political parties (26 at last count) are invited to the seminars. About half the parties regularly attend, and the larger parties always send participants. The Democratic Labor Party (successor to the Communist Party) normally sends fewer people than the two main parties on the right, but always participates to some degree. Geographical coverage is good, and a healthy percentage of participants are from surrounding towns and villages, although there has been no systematic evaluation of participation by region or by size of city/town. The political party training manual that IRI uses in the seminars is well organized and thorough and has been retained as a reference by many local leaders. IRI issues invitations both through local and national party structures to be sure the stream of participants is not bottle-necked. Since, as noted, a majority of training has been carried out by the two resident representatives, there have not been significant problems with visiting trainers unfamiliar with the Lithuanian context; visitors are briefed, and the resident representative carefully monitors their presentations and can step in if necessary. Seminars normally contain two role-playing exercises per day, which appears to be an effective way to involve the participants directly in the material and to keep their energy levels high. We heard one comment that the seminars in FY 95 were sometimes slowed by less-than-effective interpreting; but this problem appears to have been corrected by a competent full-time staff interpreter.

IRI's training efforts have had a concrete impact on the behavior of political parties, particularly at the local level. Many political activists told us convincingly that they had engaged in telephone canvassing and door-to-door campaigning for the first time, reorganized their party structures, and developed more effective relationships with the media. At least one party expanded its base into new districts following IRI seminars; others made more systematic efforts at candidate selection and message refinement. Additionally, IRI training has helped introduce the concept of civil interaction; the mayor of Ukmerge told us that while IRI seminars may not have transformed the political landscape in his city, at least people now greet one another in the city council, and are better able to discuss issues in a civil manner. Many local-level participants said they felt more positive about engaging in basic political party work; this was echoed by national leaders, who said that many of their local activists had become less passive and more participatory.

Mr. Grabauskas is in the process of preparing a questionnaire to be sent to local party leaders whose party activists have received IRI training to determine the state of each party's development and capacity. A follow-up questionnaire will be sent to the same local party leaders to identify changes. Questions in the follow-up questionnaire will take into consideration material covered in the training being implemented by IRI. This effort to mark change over time in political parties represents an important methodological advance.

No other outside donor is conducting grassroots political party training in Lithuania. The nearest equivalent is carried out by the British Conservative Party, but this is limited to the Lithuanian Conservative Party. A number of Nordic/European governments and parties provide some parliamentary training, but, as one activist said, "no one else but IRI works down here at our level." IRI has not made participation by women and youth a major part of its effort, although it may carry out a youth get-out-the-vote campaign this fall. IRI has made informal efforts to reach out to women activists, who make up 30-40 percent of seminar participants. With regard to minorities, IRI always sends invitations to the party representing Poles and the party representing Russian speakers; to date, neither party has sent members to IRI seminars.

Finally, we note that the policy to work with all parties seems to have been an unqualified success. Nearly all the seminar participants with whom we spoke said IRI had been successful at persuading them to leave their party affiliations at the door and to concentrate on the material being presented; many participants noted that the only place all political parties in Lithuania sit down together was at an IRI seminar. This is an area in which tangible results are hard to quantify, but IRI has clearly played a role in getting members of the different parties talking to one another and in some cases working more closely together.

#### **b. Effectiveness of the IRI Resident Representatives**

IRI held its first seminar in Lithuania in July 1993, and placed a resident representative in-country in July 1994. Christopher Shields is given extremely high marks for his energy, enthusiasm, and ability to connect directly and memorably with seminar participants. Mr. Shields kept a clear focus on his program objectives, and at the same time demonstrated flexibility by tailoring his presentations to the needs of the participants; he noticed, for example, that many candidates lacked basic grooming and presentation skills, and added those elements to his seminars. Mr. Shields coordinated closely with USAID/Lithuania and maintained regular contacts with the Embassy, which praised his efforts. His informal relationships with national-level political leaders enhanced the effectiveness of the program. Overall, Mr. Shields appears to have carried out a very effective "first cut" at local-level political party training in Lithuania, and to have created a credible image for IRI on which his successor has been able to build.

Daniel Grabauskas arrived in late 1995, and is midway through a three-phase series of seminars, with 25 training events planned for FY 96. We were unable to attend a training seminar given by Mr. Grabauskas because none were scheduled during our visit, and USAID personnel have only attended a brief portion of one of his presentations. However, Mr. Grabauskas has a clear understanding of what he intends to achieve, and his program seems well designed and intended to build upon materials already presented. He demonstrates an appropriate mix of focus and flexibility; he will emphasize fund-raising, for example, since all parties are keenly interested in that area, and will downplay internal-party-structure training, having judged that his predecessor has adequately addressed this area. He meets regularly with USAID, but has not, to date, had regular meetings with the Embassy (see Recommendations). He has a good working relationship with the recently arrived NDI representative who works in citizen participation/local government, and consults with the Soros Fund, Open Society, CEELI, and the Baltic American Foundation. His relationships with both local-level and national-level leaders enhance program activities.

Both representatives appear to have received adequate support from IRI in Washington. Mr. Grabauskas was involved in a serious car accident shortly after his arrival; IRI ably assisted him with medical support, allowing him to continue working with only a brief hiatus. Mr. Grabauskas spends as much as 35 percent of his time writing evaluations and handling administrative/financial details. This seems on the high side, although it may be unavoidable given IRI's demanding self-evaluation requirements. The two-person office is carrying out a large number of seminars and appears to be at or above appropriate productivity.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

The overall political context in Lithuania is receptive to the kind of work IRI has undertaken. There is less nostalgia here than in many countries for the Communist period: even bitter political rivals seem to share a healthy suspicion of Russia. At the same time, there is a strong sense among Lithuanians that they are a European people, and thus some skepticism toward the American system. IRI has largely dodged that skepticism by working directly at the grassroots level. However, we note that efforts to work in the parliament would probably encounter more resistance; such work, in fact, is already being done by other European countries whose parliamentary models are closer to Lithuania's.

In general, Lithuania's political system is vastly healthier than that of, for example, Ukraine. The country is moving toward regular alternation of power, and increasingly "normal" party activities (for which IRI can take some credit). A closer look at the political system reveals a number of remaining problems, however. These include weak party-constituent links at the deepest grassroots level, and extreme apathy among voting-age youth; this is reflected in the observation by Mr. Grabauskas that "too many of our seminar participants are 55 or older."

IRI has done an effective job at transmitting political skills. What the program has not yet addressed is the creation of a mechanism to allow Lithuanians to begin transmitting those skills on their own. There is both a need for, and a high degree of receptivity toward, such training; key leaders in three of the larger parties expressed concrete, unprompted interest in train-the-trainers assistance. This effort should be carried out after the Parliamentary elections, when the political parties will be able to focus on developing their own internal training structures.

### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ***Train-the-Trainers Programs:*** After the October parliamentary elections, IRI should work directly with the larger political parties to help them develop internal training structures. This effort should be intensive, and include not merely training but a period in which IRI goes out with the Lithuanian trainers to observe and coach them. Key training elements should address not only basic political skills but the remaining weaknesses in the political system identified above (weak links with constituents, outreach to swing voters, etc). IRI may wish to find and work with a non-partisan Lithuanian expert trainer, someone like the academic which IRI works with in Ukraine. Smaller parties probably lack the capacity to institutionalize a train-the-trainers program but could be given some help in a group seminar. IRI and USAID should make sure that enough resources are devoted to this effort that it be

real and effective, and not simply a brief “throw the notebooks at the trainers” exercise with leftover funds.

2. ***Keep Current In-Country Representative for Train-the-trainer Program:*** We guess that a real train-the-trainers effort would take six months at a minimum; Mr. Grabauskas should be strongly encouraged to stay on through that period. A new representative would be seriously disadvantaged in such an effort.
3. ***Resident IRI Representative Meets Regularly with Country Team:*** The Embassy will profit from the IRI representative's grassroots political knowledge and from having a clearer sense of what IRI is trying to accomplish--and has accomplished--in the country. The Ambassador and Political Officer have expressed interest and willingness to have closer contact.
4. ***Special Effort to Encourage Party Leaders to Invite Youth to Play Larger Role in Political Process:*** Invite youth leadership to attend IRI seminars. This would allow the parties to use the seminars not only as training exercises but as recruitment tools for younger members, something that would be healthy for the overall political system.
5. ***Keep Track of Seminar Participation:*** Keep track of seminar participation by age, political party, region, and large population center. This would allow IRI to target its coverage more precisely and identify potential gaps in coverage.

## **B. THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI)**

### **1. BACKGROUND**

In 1994 NDI received a grant from USAID to conduct a two-year local government program in Estonia and Lithuania. In the first year, NDI concentrated its efforts in Estonia. In August of 1995, NDI sent a team to Lithuania to investigate the possibilities of establishing a program in Lithuania, and in November Mark Levinson, a public administration specialist, was contracted by NDI to establish a field office in Kaunas for one year. A preliminary workplan was developed with the following objectives:

- # Assist local government officials in Kaunas, Alytus, Ukmerge and Utenain in developing mechanisms and strategies to identify and respond effectively to citizens' needs;
- # Promote citizen participation in community affairs and assist local governments in instituting procedures that guarantee their residents the opportunity to participate in the policy-setting and decision making process;
- # Strengthen the further development of an indigenous local government expertise and the capacity to train current and future local government leaders;
- # Strengthen the ability of communities throughout Lithuania to share information and work together to promote their common interests.

## **2. FINDINGS**

Mr. Levinson is co-located in Kaunas Technical University in the Faculty of Administration, the Public Administration Program (an outgrowth of the Faculty of Administration which is a graduate degree program), and the Municipal Training Center which legally is tied to Kaunas Technical University. He is presently teaching an undergraduate course concerned with promoting citizen participation, and he is also working with a number of graduate students involved in a variety of subjects. He plans to teach a graduate course in the fall in the Public Administration Program dealing with citizen participation in the public process. It is also anticipated that working with the Municipal Training Center and at times in conjunction with the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania, Mr. Levinson will work with municipalities promoting greater citizen participation. Mr. Levinson also anticipates having the students in his graduate course working with particular municipalities focusing on ways to rationalize municipal administration with a major theme being increasing the role of the citizen.

The NDI budget provides for a seminar to be held in the fall on the subject of citizen participation in local government. It also provides for a supplement to the salary of Dr. Ricardas Malkevicius, Mr. Levinson's counterpart as Director of the Municipal Training Center.

Currently there are two advisors with Development Associates, supported by USAID, addressing local government problems in two municipalities. It is anticipated that each of these advisors will be in Lithuania for two years. Mr. Levinson is in contact with these advisors and has plans to support their efforts.

## **3. CONCLUSIONS**

The process for problem articulation and activity design needs to be significantly tightened in cases where NDI is involved in promoting local government activities. A meaningful role in this process should be played by the resident USAID personnel.

Mr. Levinson is now reasonably well situated to reach into municipalities using the Municipal Training Center and the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania. There is a reasonable chance that in partnership with these two institutions, he may be able to effectively impact selected municipalities in terms of promoting greater citizen participation in local government.

However, the objectives for this activity as reflected in NDI documentation are unrealistic, particularly given the fact that Levinson is programmed to be in Lithuania for only one year. As the workplan is finally articulated, a host of questions must be addressed that include:

1. How will the curriculum for the graduate course that Mr. Levinson is to teach in the fall be institutionalized within the Public Administration Program?
2. Does the accomplishment of the objective to "strengthen the further development of an indigenous local government expertise and the capacity to train current and future local

government leaders" relate to this graduate course that is to be institutionalized in the Public Administration Program? What other activities will Mr. Levinson undertake specifically to contribute to advancing this objective?

3. Will Mr. Levinson be able to focus on the communities of Kaunas, Alytus, Ukmerge and Utenain? What assurances are there from the Municipal Training Center and the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania that a focus will be sustained on these municipalities? How much can one reasonably be expected to achieve in terms of institutionalizing processes in citizen participation in local governments in the relatively short period of 12 months?
4. What modus operandi will Levinson utilize to address the objective "to strengthen the ability of communities throughout Lithuania to share information and work together to promote their common interests?"

#### **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

6. ***Workplan Development and Objective and Outcome Identification:*** Mr. Levinson should prepare a workplan identifying activities and anticipated outcomes for each of the quarters remaining in his contract. He should be encouraged to select objectives and outcomes that reflect the current reality that he has less than nine months to work on this activity. USAID/Lithuania should have the opportunity to review the workplan before it is approved.
7. ***Institutional Arrangement of NDI and the Kaunas Technical University (KTU):*** The particulars of the institutional arrangement between KTU and NDI should be reviewed and perhaps formalized to determine if both institutions share a common vision in terms of NDI's objectives.
8. ***USAID/Lithuania to Monitor NDI Local Government Activity:*** USAID/Lithuania should monitor Mr. Levinson's activities and meet with him at least quarterly to determine the status of workplan implementation. The quarterly report prepared by NDI should be made available to USAID/Lithuania 30 days after the close of the quarter if the quarterly report is to be a useful management tool to focus USAID/Lithuania's review of implementation status with Mr. Levinson.

## **CHAPTER V: FINAL CONCLUSIONS - SOME LESSONS BEING LEARNED**

Each of the country situations presented unique circumstances. As a consequence, no conscious attempt was initially made to search for common themes. It was assumed that the final product would be four separate and distinct evaluations of IRI and NDI activities in each of the countries. However, in the course of the evaluation certain over-arching conclusions emerged.

### **A. Assistance on a Non-Partisan Basis Versus an Approach that Attempts to Balance the Playing Field**

A policy to limit political training assistance to parties deemed democratic and reform-minded may have been inevitable given the relatively unreformed nature of the Communist/Socialist parties in Bulgaria and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the policy has a significant downside. In Ukraine it has created tension with the Embassy, which feels IRI is missing the country's major power structures by limiting its work to a small group of parties. It may open the USG to accusations that it is interfering in the democratic process by trying to pick winners, which could threaten overall USG policy objectives in a given country. Finally, it burns bridges; it is difficult to imagine, for example, IRI ever carrying out non-partisan assistance to the Bulgarian parliament after having deliberately excluded the Socialists from its political party training for six years.

In sum, the level-the-playing-field policy, while justifiable in some ways, is a high-cost strategy which should be viewed as transitional in nature and reviewed regularly to see if and when it can be dropped in favor of a non-partisan approach.

### **B. Measuring Progress and Performance**

Training activities designed to strengthen political party organization at the grassroots level were universally judged by participants and political leaders in each of the four countries as having significant impact. The Evaluation Team concurred with these judgments. However, these judgments were reached in the absence of objective criteria.

To remedy this shortcoming, it was recommended that a baseline be established for each of the grassroots organizations being supported by IRI and NDI. An approach that could serve as a model is reflected in the instruments being developed by IRI in Lithuania. A questionnaire will be filled out by each local party chairperson to determine the status of political party development for those parties taking part in the IRI training. The questionnaire will serve as the baseline against which to measure change in those areas that IRI has promoted in its training. Subsequently, party chairpersons will fill out a questionnaire to determine if the training by IRI has impacted those areas of party development.

### **C. When Is Enough Enough?**

What level of development should institutions being supported by IRI and NDI have achieved before USAID assistance is terminated? Program documentation is conspicuously quiet on this point. Other than the issue of financial sustainability, what are the qualities or characteristics of a



political party, a parliament, a local government, or an electoral monitoring and civic education NGO that mark these institutions as being prepared to move on without further USAID Assistance? USAID, IRI and NDI must address this question country by country for each of the institutions being supported.

As indicated in this report, the election monitoring NGOs in Albania and Bulgaria as well as their civic education components are ready to move on but with modest amounts of technical assistance to be provide by NDI as soon as financial sustainability issues are resolved. Given NDI's experience with this type of institution, USAID/Ukraine and NDI should be able to reach common ground for end-of-project criteria for the Committee of Voters in the Ukraine. The question of criteria for NDI's local government activities is more difficult in Ukraine and Lithuania and should be addressed by USAID and NDI as soon as possible.

The problem of establishing end-of-project criteria is far more complex for parliamentary and political party development. In terms of support for political party development, when is enough enough? Aren't political parties always changing and evolving in a democracy? An agreement must be reached by the cooperating partners as to what level of political party development is acceptable for each of the countries. The indicators of progress and impact must be specific. It is not merely a matter of counting party members or winning elections, but the institutional components critical to establishing, strengthening and sustaining a democratically-based political party must be identified. Based on what IRI has done in terms of establishing a monitoring system in the four countries evaluated, we are confident that end-of-project criteria can be identified that USAID, NDI and IRI can use for rational decision making.

Criteria for activities with parliaments is more problematic given the lack of demonstrable progress in this area. However, every effort should be made to put monitoring systems in place for these activities, and these systems must include end-of-project criteria that reflect agreement between the cooperators.

#### **D. National Versus Grassroots Political Party Development**

There has been considerable discussion throughout the region as to whether political party training is best focused at the national or local level. This debate is prompted by the circumstance that most of the countries in the region are seeing the emergence of a multitude of political parties struggling to establish a national presence without a broad base of support at the grassroots level.

We think that the great majority of political party training efforts should be aimed at the local level. However, seminars or informal consultations should be conducted periodically with national party leaders to link local political party infrastructure with national organizations.

#### **E. Do IRI and NDI Really Have Something to Offer in the Area of Political Party Organization?**

An oft heard question is: What can IRI or NDI possibly teach politicians in this region about political party development and organization? Weren't the Communists the best in the business

when it came to organizing political parties? In fact, the focus of IRI and NDI training for political activists is concerned with how to organize a political party that is democratic in its operation. There is a fundamental difference between a political party that is a volunteer organization and one that is totalitarian in its structure and operations. A number of members of the new socialist and communist parties are learning this lesson in IRI and NDI fora. Another dimension of IRI and NDI training is the emphasis on broad-based participation on a volunteer basis. These two organizations bring a wealth of electioneering experience to the training that promote tactics, foreign to the communist experience, that encourage direct contact with the voter.

#### **F. Training of Trainers for Political Party Development**

Developing effective political parties is a long and difficult task. In each of the countries reviewed, arguments could be made that the training could go on for several more years. Obviously, given the scarcity of resources and current attitudes about the duration of activities funded with grant resources, it is necessary to identify a timeframe that allows for IRI and NDI to withdraw from these activities as soon as it is reasonable.

Recognizing that the work will never be finished to everyone's satisfaction, an option should be considered to offer a final increment of training of trainers in the area of political party development and organization. This would serve to institutionalize the training provided by IRI and NDI in the indigenous political parties.

#### **G. Training Methodologies for Grassroots Political Party Development**

A number of different methodologies are being employed by IRI and NDI to reach political activists at the grassroots level. As judged by the participants themselves, no approach was perceived as wanting. It is obvious that both organizations are accomplished in communicating messages that result in enhanced knowledge of how to strengthen a democratic political party. However, the approach taken by IRI in the Ukraine might serve as a model to be emulated by both organizations. This approach effectively orchestrates American trainers who have hands-on, grassroots expertise with Ukrainian experts and the IRI residential staff. The teaching techniques employed blend formal presentations by American and Ukrainian experts with exercises that encourage the participants from different political affiliations to work together to seek common solutions to problems.

Other important aspects of IRI's approach are the tight focus of each training event; repeat visits to cities/regions with instruction that evolves from one relevant topic to another; participation that includes political activists in the smaller communities outside of the large cities; and informal consultations to help activists implement skills promoted in the training activities.

#### **H. Building Indigenous Civic Education Institutions**

NDI is currently helping to build civic education institutions of a non-partisan character in three of the countries reviewed. Factors of consequence that NDI is constantly being reminded of are:

- # There are no magic solutions for achieving financial sustainability in countries with little tradition for NGOs and scant economic capacity for generating indigenous resources to sustain these emerging NGOs;
- # The type of outreach mechanism designed to link an NGO's central office with its grassroots affiliates will vary from country to country. However, it must always be predicated on least-cost solutions;
- # The desire to promote decision making at the grassroots level must always be balanced with the need to ensure that the leadership of the grassroots organizations sustains a non-partisan approach;
- # In the absence of specific criteria, it is extremely difficult to assess the impact of the civic education components of election monitoring NGOs. Though thousands of Bulgarians and Albanians have taken part in fora held throughout Bulgaria and Albania that were concerned with promoting citizen participation in local government, does this represent a satisfactory level impact to justify USAID support for these institutions? What outcomes should NDI collect data for over the next couple of years to gauge the performance of these institutions? Support for civic education activities, as long as it is modestly priced, have been accepted as an article of faith. But, in the climate of extremely scarce resources, this type of institutional investment must be curtailed. In the meantime, an effort must be made to identify outcomes that can be used by NDI and USAID as it makes decisions regarding follow-on support. A final question emerges when identifying outcomes. Counting the number of people who have taken part in fora is relatively simple. Determining if the democratic culture has been actually deepened as a result of citizens taking part in these civic education fora is far more complex. Can USAID afford to install measurement tools that determine if attitudes have changed? Probably not.

## **I. Monitoring and Evaluation**

USAID personnel, both Washington and field-based, have only on rare occasions made site visits to IRI and NDI activities. Nor is there any indication that the formal reporting, either quarterly or semi-annual, has been used by IRI, NDI and USAID personnel to monitor progress against the commitments established in the workplans. There is little record of meetings having taken place in the country settings to review progress as part of a monitoring process. In sum, monitoring of these activities has been less intense than what would seem to be desirable.

This undoubtedly reflects the fact that these activities were initially conceived as regional in character with ultimate responsibility resting with USAID/Washington. Initially, USAID field missions were unprepared to play a meaningful role with regard to monitoring these activities. However, the situation is now different, and field-based USAID personnel are in a better position to assume greater monitoring responsibilities in conjunction with their colleagues in the Country Team.

These activities are important to the formation of democratic practices in the four countries reviewed despite the relatively small sums of money that are being allocated for these activities. Consequently, USAID field-based personnel should be encouraged to play a greater role, if not the lead role, in monitoring the activities of IRI and NDI. Integral components of an effective monitoring system in the field should be the review of the workplan, timely receipt of progress reports, and timely review by appropriate Country Team personnel of the progress reports against the workplan with IRI and NDI respectively.

**SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF  
THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE AND  
THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE  
(180-0021 and 110-0007)**

**SCOPE OF WORK**

**A. Purpose**

The goal of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of the National Democratic Institute's (NDI) and the International Republican Institute's (IRI) SEED-funded programs in Albania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania, and NDI's and IRI's Freedom Support Act (FSA)-funded programs in Ukraine.

**B. Background -- Project Goals and Strategy**

The Political and Social Process Project (180-0021) for Central and Eastern Europe, first authorized in May 1992, supports the political infrastructure necessary for a pluralistic, multi-party political system: political parties, independent trade unions, NGOs prepared to contribute to community self-help and the like (Action Memorandum, 5/6/92). In 1992, the most pressing needs in the area of political process were grouped under "election-related assistance: . . . a) election monitoring to allow independent, international election observer teams to monitor elections in Eastern European countries; b) development of electoral institutions by establishing independent election commissions, drafting new election statutes, and developing general mechanisms to ensure free, open, and fair multi-party elections; and c) providing development assistance to political parties and non-governmental organizations through which citizens can effectively express their political views and interests."

Project 180-0021 was amended in 1994; its PACD date was extended to December 31, 1998. With basic freedoms secured, the focus of the Project shifted in 1993 and 1994 to strengthen the capacity of the institutions and political organizations, including the legislative branch of government, political parties, and civic organizations, that animate and participate in a democratic political process. A "push-pull" strategy developed in several countries, including Albania and Bulgaria, in which political parties, parliaments, and local government officials have been "pushed" or encouraged in their efforts at public outreach and constituency servicing while non-governmental organizations, especially non-partisan citizens organizations, have been "pulled" or encouraged to raise their voice and participate actively in the political process between election cycles.

The Democratic Pluralism Initiatives Project (110-0007) for the Newly Independent States, first authorized in April 1992, supports the states of the former Soviet Union in the political transformation from a one-party, centralized communist regime to pluralistic democracies. Towards this end, the project addresses the following areas: political and social process, rule of law,

independent media, democratic governance and public administration, and the development of non-governmental organizations.

The political process efforts focus on helping individuals and organizations participate freely, fairly, and competitively in the political process, thereby effecting political, economic, and social change. These programs support, on a non-partisan basis, the development of political parties, political coalition building, independent labor unions, and the conduct of free and fair elections.

### **C. The Grantees' Role: 1992-1994**

The International Republican Institute (IRI) has specialized in assistance to political parties. It has sought to strengthen the local structures of pro-democratic parties, improve communications between local and national structures of political parties, and in Ukraine and Albania, to strengthen the independence and political effectiveness of parliament. IRI has largely been responsible for the "push" of the strategy outlined above by emphasizing the importance of communicating with voters and consulting with non-governmental organizations to its counterpart political party activists, parliamentarians, and local government officials.

The National Democratic Institute's primary goal in the Balkans, as exemplified in Albania and Bulgaria, and one element of its three-pronged approach in Ukraine, is to build the capacity of domestic, non-partisan citizens organizations to monitor elections. In non-election years, these counterpart organizations, with coaching and support from NDI, have increasingly sought to facilitate citizen participation in the political process -- thus the "pull" component of the strategy. In Ukraine, NDI has implemented a parliamentary advising program. The parliamentary advising is the second "prong" in NDI's strategy in Ukraine. The third prong is a political party development program, similar to IRI's.

### **D. The Cooperative Agreements: Stated Objectives**

For Central and Eastern Europe, NDI signed a cooperative agreement on July 26, 1991, funded under Project 180-0017, at a level of \$3,230,304. The agreement ended on February 28, 1995, though the country programs to be evaluated here received continuing funding through a new cooperative agreement. This agreement is dated July 13, 1994 and is authorized at a funding level of \$3,326,724 under Project 180-0021. End date is currently September 30, 1996.

Cumulative obligations (both cooperative agreements) as of September 30, 1995: Albania -- \$1,415,109; Bulgaria -- \$1,478,699. For the NIS, NDI signed a cooperative agreement on June 10, 1992, funded under Project 110-0007, at a level of \$4,775,004. The agreement ended August 31, 1994. NDI signed a new cooperative agreement on August 22, 1994 for \$12,000,000 under Project 110-0007. The activity completion date is June 30, 1997. The combined obligations for both cooperative agreements in Ukraine, as of September 30, 1995: \$3,299,101.

## Albania

### NDI's Objectives:

- # To create a local capacity for election monitoring, voter education, and get-out-the-vote campaigns and create a local advocacy group for free and fair elections.
- # To increase citizens' awareness of and interest in the democratic process; to encourage citizens to exercise their rights to hold elected representatives accountable for their actions; and to help elected officials communicate effectively their policy agendas to citizens.
- # To strengthen the management, educational, and organizational capacities of the Society for Democratic Culture (SDC) at the national and local levels, and to assist other NGOs with their developmental needs.

### Summarized from NDI's workplan:

NDI offers material and technical assistance to the SDC to help the organization consolidate its internal operations and external programs. NDI's field representative helps the SDC staff to obtain additional funding, develop programs, and otherwise increase the organization's capacity.

NDI assists the SDC in the development and implementation of a comprehensive elections program that covers local by-elections, referenda, and national elections. This includes helping to write an election plan and timetable with elements of voter education, poll worker training, and election day monitoring. NDI also is developing a train-the-trainers program in which Albanian volunteers train their fellow citizens how to monitor polling sites.

NDI and SDC have organized conferences and facilitated meetings for NGOs to discuss ways NGOs can participate in the legislative process.

## Bulgaria

### Objectives:

- # To create a local capacity for election monitoring, voter education, and get-out-the-vote campaigns and create a local advocacy group for free and fair elections.
- # To promote effective dialogue between citizens and elected officials, to encourage citizens to hold parliamentarians and other elected officials accountable for their actions, and for elected officials to be responsive to the concerns of their constituents.
- # To increase citizens' awareness of and involvement in the democratic process by providing information on the various offices and positions within municipal administrations as well as the specific functions, responsibilities, and resources of local government.

- # To assist the BAFECR structure at the national and local levels to design and implement activities that involve a wide range of citizens who can demonstrate to elected Bulgarian politicians the importance of and ways to respond to the concerns of the citizens they represent.

Summarized from the most recent workplan:

NDI and BAFECR are working to reverse the trends of power relationships that give national party headquarters the authority to choose local candidates by inserting community views and people power into the equation. In order to do this, NDI and BAFECR are working in a program to get community input on the priorities in a given community and the general characteristics that make a good local official. This approach should have the effect of influencing candidate selection at the time of local elections.

BAFECR national staff works with Members of Parliament responsible for election law reform to advocate changes in the law, such as the establishment of a permanent election committee, and to eliminate shortcomings such as media access and candidate registration.

Ukraine

Between 1992-94, NDI focused on helping Ukrainians prepare for and participate in parliamentary, presidential, and local elections. Since the elections, NDI has been working to promote political participation and democratic-institution building.

Objectives:

- # To work with existing parties at the national level to strengthen their capacities for outreach, platform development, public opinion research, grassroots organization, fundraising, and media relations.
- # To assist issue-oriented civic organizations and work to promote citizen participation and advocacy.
- # To work with democratic mayors and local councils to define and understand their roles and responsibilities as legislators, politicians, and representatives, and to help them to improve links between local and federal authorities.
- # To work with democratically-oriented factions of the parliament on constituency outreach and coalition building.

Summarized from the workplan:

NDI works with reform-oriented parties based in Kiev that have some claim to a national presence on questions of organization, post-election activities, fundraising, media relations, and regional outreach and grassroots development.



NDI conducts political party seminars throughout Ukraine which bring together local deputies, party leaders, civic activists, and business people to discuss democratic procedures, coalition building, the relationships between elected officials, parties, civic associations, and constituents, and to develop political skills.

NDI has conducted pairs of seminars on constituency outreach for each of five different parliamentary factions: the Rukh, Reform, Unity, Republican, and Interregional factions. The first seminar focused on the concept of representation, mechanisms for community outreach, and the opportunities that constituency services can provide for reelection and party building. The second seminar measures the progress and to develop plans for the future.

## D.2. International Republican Institute

For Central and Eastern Europe, IRI signed a cooperative agreement on August 27, 1991, funded under Project 180-0017. Six modifications have been made, including moving the program to Project 180-0021. A total of \$7,609,417 has been obligated thus far. Program end date is October 31, 1996. Cumulative obligations in the targeted country programs as of August 31, 1995: Albania -- \$1,180,754; Bulgaria -- \$1,478,699; Lithuania -- \$703,679.

For the NIS, IRI signed a Cooperative Agreement on August 12, 1994, funded under Project 110-0007 for \$12,000,000. A prior Cooperative Agreement funded under Project 110-0007 did not include Ukraine. Program end date is June 30, 1997. Obligations in Ukraine as of May 31, 1995: \$1,887,680.

### Albania

#### Objectives:

- # To strengthen the parliament as a democratic institution by increasing its ability to serve as an independent legislative body.
- # To enhance the political system by working to build more effective and representative political party structures throughout Albania, and to improve intra-party relationships and communication between national parties headquartered in Tirana and their local branch offices in the districts.
- # To strengthen confidence in Albania's democratic political system by increasing the public's awareness of and access to parliament and political parties.
- # To increase the participation and effectiveness of women and women's organizations in the political process.

In order to achieve these objectives:

Summarized from the workplan:

IRI conducts political party building training seminars to strengthen party structures and improve intra-party relationship and communication between national political parties headquartered in Tirana and their local branch offices in the districts as well as the inter-party relationships and communication between different local political parties in the districts. These seminars include all major national political parties. The seminars focus on grassroots organization, volunteer recruitment, constituent outreach, candidate recruitment, and political communication skills.

IRI works directly with the leadership of parliament, parliamentary committee chairmen, members of parliament, their professional staffs, and democratic political parties as a way to increase the capacity of parliament and political parties to function efficiently and effectively in the legislative process. IRI provides training on the role of committees in overseeing the activities of the government, on coalition-building within Parliament, and on developing rules and procedures of parliament.

IRI holds political fora for women in different regions of Albania to increase the involvement of women in the political activities at both the local and national levels. IRI works to increase the contacts among women regionally and nationally, to develop leadership skills among women, to foster grassroots participation by women in politics, and to provide a forum for women to develop political skills.

Bulgaria

Objectives:

- # To strengthen political parties at the local level through training focused in effective political outreach, organizational techniques, communication strategies and methods, candidate recruitment, issues identification, and constituency building.
- # To assist local political parties in their non-election year activities and in building strong relationships with their party representatives in parliament.
- # To increase participation of women and young Bulgarians in the political process by strengthening organizations for women and future leaders and establishing political internship programs.

In order to achieve these objectives, IRI holds seminars relating to these activities and as of May 1995 has two resident trainers in Sofia who work on these activities.

IRI has several activities relating to the development of local political party development work. IRI conducts one day rural seminars to assist political parties with grassroots organization, organization and development in non-election years, campaign preparation, and providing basic individual

instruction and assistance. IRI also holds larger seminars which focus on practical and effective methods of party building and grassroots activism and bring together local elected officials, party activists, and Members of Parliament (MP) from the surrounding region.

Prior to the national elections on December 18, 1994, IRI administered a Get-Out-The-Vote campaign intended to increase the awareness of, and participation in, Bulgaria's voting process through public service announcements, advertisements, and distribution of posters.

IRI conducts seminars targeted towards women and younger Bulgarians. Within some party structures there are either women's or youth organizations, and where possible IRI uses these as a base to further develop and initiate these target groups into the Bulgarian political spectrum. IRI also tries to include non-partisan and unaffiliated women and youth in these programs.

### Lithuania

#### Objectives:

- # To strengthen Lithuania's political parties at the local level;
- # To provide organizational models and strategies which can be replicated throughout the country by local activists thereby reaching a larger grassroots audience;
- # To provide a practical arena to reinforce training topics from the local training seminars and regional conferences.

IRI conducts local and regional seminars outside the major cities in order to focus assistance on often overlooked areas. The seminars include instruction on organization and management of local structures, internal and external communication, and campaign preparation and management. Between 1992-1995, IRI held training seminars on these topics throughout Lithuania.

### Ukraine

#### Objectives:

- # To strengthen and develop political parties and coalitions, particularly at the local level, in order to help establish a broader and firmer base for democratic participation.
- # To enhance the ability of local political activists and parties to build coalitions and to aid in identifying and training viable candidates and campaign workers.
- # To work with factions of the parliament on constituency outreach and coalition building.

IRI holds grassroots training seminars designed to facilitate local party and local legislative training in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odessa, Cherkasy, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil. In recent seminars, the focus has been party organization, political communication, and party activist training.

IRI also holds national parliamentary training seminars.

### **C. Purpose of the Evaluation; Issues to be Addressed**

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine 1) whether NDI and IRI are meeting -- or, in the case of Ukraine, are in a position to meet -- their own established objectives in the selected countries; and 2) how different divisions of labor and working arrangements between NDI and IRI are functioning -- complementing, duplicating, reinforcing, or not connecting with each other. Within these overall objectives, there are several specific issues in Attachment 1, which the Contractor will address in the course of the evaluation.

### **D. Team Composition**

The team will consist of two people. Both team members should possess superior written and verbal communication skills. Preference will be given to a team with relevant regional and developmental experience. USAID reserves the right to appoint a USAID and/or other USG employee(s) to act in the capacity as a team member, observer, or consultant throughout this process.

The evaluation team will possess the following required characteristics:

- (1) A team leader with a professional background in developmental work, preferably with appropriate regional experience. This person must have previous experience in working on evaluations.
- (2) The second team member must have strong background knowledge of the region. Preference will be given to someone who also has experience in developmental work, especially democracy programming.

The Contractor will certify that there is no conflict of interest with respect to the performance of this evaluation on the part of the contractor and each team member for this evaluation.

The Contractor will guarantee that substitutions will not be made for individuals selected as team members without the approval of ENI/DG/PSP. If substitutions have to be made and if ENI/DG/PSP does not concur in the substitutions, the evaluation will be cancelled or postponed at ENI/DG/PSP's option.

Contractor will also guarantee that the approved team members will be available for all aspects of the time schedule. Site visit shall begin after October 1, 1995.

### **E. Methodology**

Prior to departure:

- (1) Contractor shall review background documents, including:

- o project authorizations
- o grant agreements, amendments
- o trip reports
- o quarterly and semi-annual reports
- o audit reports (GAO/IG)
- o other referential or historic documents

(2) Contractor shall conduct interviews and hold briefings with USAID staff in Washington and visit NDI's and IRI's offices in Washington, DC. Telephone conversations will be held with USAID representatives in Tirana, Sofia, Vilnius, and Kiev, for advice on whom to interview in Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Ukraine and for help in scheduling appointments. (Attachment 2 includes a list of pertinent people with whom, at a minimum, the Contractor will meet.) NDI and IRI staff will meet with the team to answer questions as needed, but will not accompany team on meetings with government and non-government officials.

ENI/DG/PSP staff will schedule briefings with the evaluation team to ensure pre-field evaluation exchanges with USAID/W officials and grantees; and to provide an opportunity for team-building. Approximately five workdays will be needed in Washington, D.C. to review background materials and meet with USAID and recipient organizations' staff.

(3) ENI/DG/PSP will obtain country clearances for the team.

(4) During field work, the Contractor shall conduct an extensive review of the work carried out as of the time of this evaluation by NDI and IRI in order to assess progress toward the objectives established for their activities and effectiveness of overall project strategy. This review will include meetings with U.S. Embassy and USAID representatives, meetings with the recipients and host country counterparts, and meetings with a representative sample of NDI and IRI training recipients.

(5) Contractor shall brief USAID Representatives in the field upon arrival and shall present a summary of preliminary findings to the USAID representative prior to departure.

(6) Contractor shall present preliminary findings to ENI/DG/PSP staff upon its return from the field.

## **F. Schedule**

The site visit shall begin no earlier than October 1, 1995 nor begin any later than December 1, 1995. Five days will be required in Washington prior to departure. This time frame will include deciding whom to see in the host countries and scheduling appointments for field meetings, collection and review of documents and team building. The field evaluation will require a minimum of six workdays in each of the following countries: Albania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. In addition, three days will be required in Lithuania. Following the field work, approximately one week will be needed for debriefing and draft report preparation. Finally, up to one week will be required after receipt of USAID feedback for the final report.

## **G. Logistical Support**

All logistical support will be provided by the Contractor to include travel, transportation, secretarial and office support, interpretation, report printing and communication, as appropriate.

## **H. Workweek**

A six-day workweek is authorized.

## **I. Deliverables**

**Workplan.** One week prior to departure, the Contractor shall submit a draft work plan to ENI/DG/PSP for concurrence.

**Benchmark indicators.** Prior to departure, the Contractor shall propose measures for assessing the impact, effectiveness, and efficiency of NDI's and IRI's programs, for USAID approval.

**Report.** The Contractor shall produce a final report which includes:

(1) **Executive Summary.** A summary, not to exceed three single-spaced pages, should list, in order of priority, the major findings, conclusions, and lessons learned from the evaluation.

(2) **Body of the Report** (not to exceed 32 pages). Generally, the analysis should be structured in the following way: findings, conclusions, recommendations. Specifically, the report should:

- (a) describe the impact and/or identify successful activities and accomplishments achieved by NDI and IRI by country;
- (b) alert the reader to possible problem areas;
- (c) identify, in order of importance, NDI and IRI activities which should be modified or discontinued, with justifications that supports these recommendations;
- (d) assess communication and areas for improvement between AID/Washington, NDI, IRI, and the field;
- (e) comprehensively address issues listed in Attachment 1;

(3) **Appendices.**

Five (5) copies of the draft report and ten (10) copies of the final report (nine bound and one loose leaf) shall be submitted by the Contractor to ENI/DG/PSP for distribution. The draft and final reports will be presented in hard copy and on a diskette in the format "WordPerfect 5.2 for Windows." The report should be no longer than 35 pages. Additional material should be submitted as Annexes, as appropriate (e.g. Scope of Work, bibliography of documents analyzed, list of agencies and persons interviewed, list of sites visited, etc.)

Immediately after return from the field, draft summary findings and conclusions will be verbally presented to ENI staff at a preliminary briefing. A draft final report shall be submitted no later than one week following the team's return to the U.S. for USAID/ENI review.

Subsequent to the ENI bureau review meeting, comments will be requested from the grantees. USAID's and grantees' comments will be given to the evaluation team within approximately one week following receipt of the draft final report. Within one week of receipt of those comments, the evaluation team will prepare and submit a final report that responds to USAID's and the grantees' comments.

## DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

**UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT/WASHINGTON**

- Action Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Near East, Social Process and Cultural Pluralism Project (180-0021), March 22, 1991.
- Action Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Near East, Social Process and Cultural Pluralism Project (180-0021), Authorization of Assistance for Albania, June 21, 1991.
- Action Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Near East, Social Process and Cultural Pluralism Project (180-0021), Authorization Amendment #1, August 6, 1991.
- Action Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Near East, Social Process and Cultural Pluralism Project (180-0021), Authorization of Assistance for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania #1, September 16, 1991.
- Action Memorandum for the Director for the Regional Mission for Europe, Request for Authorization for the Political and Social Process Project (180-0021), May 5, 1992.
- Action Memorandum for the Director for the Regional Mission for Europe, Request for Amendment to the Project Authorization for the Political and Social Process Project (180-0021), Amendment #3, December 22, 1992.
- Request for Amendment to the Project Authorization for the Political and Social Process Project (180-0021), Amendment #4, March 1, 1994.
- Action Memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and the Newly Independent States, Request for Amendment #4 to the Project Authorization for the Political and Social Process Project (180-0021), June 29, 1994.
- Project Memorandum, New Independent States: Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (110-0007), April 10, 1992.
- Project Memorandum, New Independent States: Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (110-0007), Amendment No.1., February 3, 1993.
- Project Memorandum, New Independent States: Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (110-0007), Amendment No.2., September 9, 1993.
- Project Memorandum, New Independent States: Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (110-0007), Amendment No.3., July 21, 1994.
- Project Memorandum, New Independent States: Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (110-0007), Amendment No.4., April 3, 1995.
- Evaluation of the Parliamentary Assistance in Central and Eastern European (CEE) Countries Under The Democratic Governance and Administration Project, 180-0019, Development Associates, Inc., January, 1996.
- Cooperative Agreement No. EUR-0017-A-00-1064-00 with NDI, July 26, 1991.
- Cooperative Agreement No. EUR-0017-A-00-1064-00 with NDI, Modification No.01, September 29, 1991.
- Cooperative Agreement No. EUR-0021-A-00-4028-00 with NDI, June 13, 1994.
- Cooperative Agreement, Modification No.5 with NDI, No. EUR-0017-A-00-1064-00, September 30, 1994.
- Further Clarification of Budget for Cooperative Agreement, No. EUR-0017-A-00-1064-00 with NDI, December 12, 1994.
- Cooperative Agreement No. EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00 with IRI, August 27, 1991.
- Cooperative Agreement No. EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, Modification 02 with IRI. November 16, 1992.
- Cooperative Agreement No. EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, Modification 03 with IRI. July 6, 1993.
- Cooperative Agreement No. EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, Amendment No.04 with IRI, June 3, 1994.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

- Memorandum from Ian Kelly, S/NIS/C, and Steve Coffey, DRL. Subject: Democracy Program Review, March 9, 1995.

**INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE/WASHINGTON**



- IRI FY 95 - FY 96, Cost Breakdown Per Objective.
- Training Exercises.

#### **NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE/WASHINGTON**

- National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Statement of Mission, February, 1995.
- How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections, An A to Z Guide, Handbook, NDI, 1995.
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## **LITHUANIA MATERIALS**

### **IRI MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS**

- Lithuania Situation Update 1995 Municipal Elections. April 5, 1995.
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- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, August 1992.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, September 1992.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, October 1992.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, April, May, June 1993.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, July, August, September, 1993.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, October, November, December, 1993.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-A-00-1065-00, January, February, March, 1994.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-00-1065-00, April, May, June, 1994.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-00-1065-00-A, July, August, September, 1994.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-00-1065-00-A, October, November, December, 1994.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-00-1065-00-A, January, February, March, 1995.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-00-1065-00-A, April, May, June, 1995.
- Report on Baltic Activities, Grant # EUR-0017-00-1065-00-A, July, August, September, 1995.
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### **IRI TRAINING MATERIALS**

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### **NDI MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS**

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- Political Structure: Lithuania, EIU Country Report, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996, 1st Quarter 1996.

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- Grace Moe, Vice President
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- Julie Brennan, Assistant Program Officer for Lithuania
- Lori Soderstrom, Program Assistant for Albania
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- Thomas O. Melic, Senior Associate
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- Paul McCarthy, Balkans
- Rodger Potocki, Baltics
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**CARNEGIE FOUNDATION**

- Tom Carothers

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### **US EMBASSY**

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- Dianne Blaine, Director
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### **IRI**

- Peter Dickinson, Country Program Director

### **NDI**

- Alicia Allison, Field Representative

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- Shpresa Spaluu, Secretary and Interpreter
- Saimir Tvziku, Program Officer
- Raimond Pengu, Sociologist

### **DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE**

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### **REPUBLICAN PARTY**

- Fatmir Mediu, Vice President of the Republican Party
- Arjan Madhi, Chairman of the Electoral Sector of the Republican Party
- Shemedin Ruci, local leader, Fier
- Albert Nasto, local leader, Fier

### **SOCIALIST PARTY**

- Musa Ulqini, MP, Chairman of Tirana Branch
- Petro Koci, local leader, Fier

### **DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

- Mirush Mati, Head of Organization Department
- Valter Paci, General Secretary of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania
- Edward Selami, MP
- Leonard Bitri, local leader, Fier
- Agron Demo, local leader, Fier

### **FOCUS INTERVIEW, DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERSHIP, ELBASAN**

- Flir Dumani, local leader, Elbasan
- Beatrice Ballici, local leader, Elbasan
- Blendi Gremi, local leader, Elbasan
- Elda Basha, local leader, Elbasan
- Fatmir Terziu, local leader, Elbasan
- Mihal Goni, local leader, Elbasan
- Dhimiter Tauanxhiu, local leader, Elbasan
- Flamur Shobani, local leader, Elbasan

### **BELSHI**

- Hoschu Murote, Education Committee, CRS Training at Belshi

### **WOMEN'S CENTER**

- Delina Fico, Program Coordinator

**SOCIETY FOR DEMOCRATIC CULTURE**

- Miranda Gace, Executive Director
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- Anika Dede, Finance Director
- Dritan Mara, Press Representative (part-time)
- Jerji Memo, Office Manager
- Anete Mijali, Secretary and Translator
- Ilir Sjqina, Regional Coordinator
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- Leonidha Mine, Vice President of Fier Branch, high school teacher
- Dhimitrag Zografi, President of Elbasan Branch, teacher
- Eduard Hoxholli, Elbasan Branch, teacher
- Tcheti Shyti, Elbasan Branch, teacher

**PARTICIPANTS AT DURRES MEETING SPONSORED BY THE SOCIETY FOR DEMOCRATIC CULTURE FOLLOWED BY A FOCUS INTERVIEW, MARCH 2**

- Nevruz Cela, Member of Parliament
- Sotiraq Puro, Executive Council member of SDC, teacher
- Ilir Xaxa, President of Durres SDC, teacher
- Adi Veli, teacher
- Ilir Laska, student
- Erjon Ramzoti, student
- Aurel Hoxha, SDC member, student
- Enri Beqoviq, student
- Denis Rakipl, student
- Ermal Zalefi, student
- Ritvan Lazi, student
- Fatjon Ceka, businessman
- Ilir Agolli, SDC member
- Shpetim Koocha, SDC member, teacher
- Alqi Mano, economist
- Shkelzen Xaxa, SDC member, economist
- Mehdi Raunhita, SDC member and Ex-Officer of local chapter
- Mehmet Osam Kresniqi
- Ylli Slasan Cankjo, SDC member, teacher
- Agim Carcani, teacher
- Nexhat Spahiu, administrator
- Gezim Hajasi, administrator
- Petrit Cercuzu, economist
- Alush Kuci, economist
- Myftar Gionbal, teacher
- Hanen Ulqini, teacher
- Yeli Lekor, director
- Artur Korriku, journalist
- Sami Brahim, SDC member, cook
- Shyrene Biqiri, SDC member, teacher
- Roland Xaxa, engineer



## **BULGARIA**

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- Rose Likins, Charge d'Affaires
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- Keith Bennett, Second Secretary

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- Ivan Krastev, Center for Liberal Strategies, Program Director for Political Research, Presidency of the Republic
- Yulia Gourkoovska, Chief of Cabinet, Presidency of the Republic
- Deyan Kyuranov, Center for Liberal Strategies, Presidency of the Republic
- Kamen Yelichkov, Foreign Policy Advisor, Presidency of the Republic
- Vladimir Stirov, Foreign Ministry, Chief of Human Rights Department

### **IRI**

- Scott Carpenter, Resident Program Officer
- Phil Tanis, Resident Program Officer
- Milena Nedeva, Translator and Administrative Assistant

### **UDF (UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES)**

- Christo Bisserov, MP, Secretary General of Party
- Michail R. Michailov, MP, Member of Local Government Committee
- Peter Stoyanov, MP, Vice-Chairman of the Party
- Mario I. Tagarinsky, MP, Member of Economic Committee
- Ilia D. Lazarov, Information Coordinator, National Coordination Council
- Vasilka Paplomatas, Chairman of Regional and Municipal Organization of Stara Zagora
- Georgi Paplomatas, Campaign Manager for Star Zagora
- Rumen Rashov, Campaign Manager, Veliko Turnovo
- Konstantin Dochev, City Councilman, Veliko Turnovo

### **DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

- Joro Gueorgiev, National Coordinator, formally District Coordinator of UDF

### **GREEN PARTY**

- Alexander Karakachanov, Party President

### **AGRARIAN NATIONAL UNION**

- Anastasia Dimitrov Moser, MP, Party Chairwoman
- Katia Tchouratska, Aide for student sector
- Dimiter Chukarski, Aide
- Roumen Iontchev, Advisor to Vice-President of the National Assembly
- Jana Janif, Chairman of the expert committee with the Agrarian Union

### **MOVEMENT FOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOM PARTY**

- Kasim Dal, Vice-President
- Gyuner Tahir, MP

### **CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY**

- Ognian Shenton, President

### **CENTER FOR LIBERAL STRATEGIES**

- Eugeri Dainov, Director

**BULGARIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FAIR ELECTIONS AND CIVIL RIGHTS  
(BAFECR)**

- Michael Yanakiev, Executive Director
- Gergana Yankova, Program Director for Local Government
- Rubina Minkova, Press Secretary
- Maria Androvska, Assistant Financial Officer
- Galina Videnova, Grants Administrator
- Mariana Dreska, Program Director
- Christo Ruossanvo, Regional Chairman, Veliko Turnovo
- Mariana Nicolova Stojanova, Secretary, Veliko Turnovo
- Dimo Georgiev Dimor, Volunteer, Veliko Turnovo
- Nikolai Draganon, Volunteer, Veliko Turnovo
- Darin Mikhailov, President of the Gabrovo Club, Regional Chairman
- Nicolay Ivanov Izvorov, Volunteer, Gabrovo
- Katia Dimova Veleheya, Secretary, Gabrovo

**PARTICIPANTS AT PLEVEN MEETING, FOCUS INTERVIEW, MARCH 9, 1996**

<u>Name</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Representation</u>
- Kimon Fomitski	Translator	Rotary
- Yuri Filipov	Office Coordinator	member
- Krasimir Dankov	Legal Consultant	member
- Kristomir Shumakov	Student	Boy Scouts
- Emil Tsvetkov	Insurance	
- Asparuk Georgiev	City Councilman	former member
- Margarita Nixolova	Physician	member
- Ivan Radulov	Teacher	member
- Emilia Radulova	Teacher	member
- Svбка Simeonova		member
- Svetlin Tufeshki	Chauffeur	member
- Miroslav Shetovski	Student	member
- Rositsa Bozhkova	Student	member
- Emilia Kurshovska	Secretary	member
- Kristo Genkov		member
- Mariana Rusanova	Student	member
- Yuri Georgiev	Student	member
- Krasimir Paniatov		member
- Zdravko Velikov	Organ./Pensioners	

**PLEVEN**

- Iliia Moncev, Member of City Council

**GABROVO**

- Miroslav Katandjico, Deputy Mayor
- Mrs. Tomova, political activist

**NGO COMMUNITY**

- Mariana Milosheva, President of CRGA

## **UKRAINE**

### **US EMBASSY**

- Eric S. Rubin, First Secretary

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- Rodger Yocheson, Office of Democratic and Social Transition
- Yaro Kulchycky, Office of Democratic and Social Transition
- Ann Arness, Program Office
- Pat Sommers, Program Office
- Chris Wright, Program Office

### **IRI**

- Tom Garrett, Head of IRI
- Chris Holzen, Deputy Head
- Dr. Valentin Korolko, Instructor, University Professor, Political Scientist and Sociology, Member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science
- John Mizner, Trainer, Pennsylvania, Lawyer, electioneering background
- Ronald Van De Hey, Trainer, Wisconsin, County Executive, Mayor, coalition builder
- Alexander Boukhalov, Logistics Coordinator
- Vadim Naumov, Translator

### **PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AT THE IRI TRAINING, TERNOPIL**

- Anzhela Lapoonova, Christian Democratic Party
- Oksana Lihanova, Christian Democratic Party
- Mykhailo Andruntsiv, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Ternopil, Deputy in the Oblast Council
- Tetyana Bilko, Press Secretary of the Ternopil Christian Democratic Party
- Amyani Vasyluk, no party affiliation

### **FOCUS INTERVIEW AT THE IRI TRAINING, TERNOPIL**

- Mykhailo Andruntsiv, Chairman of the Democratic Party of Ternopil, Deputy in the Oblast Council
- Vitali Rakulenka, Chairman of the Republican Party of Ternopil, Secretariat at the Oblast
- Mykhailo Hutor, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party of Ternopil, Deputy Chairman of the National Christian Democratic Party
- Petro Kalyta, Deputy Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party of Ternopil

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- Diane Tauser, Field Program Officer for Political Party Development
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- Naome Wische, Program Assistant
- Karina Milosovich, Program Assistant
- Yuri Besarab, Interpreter
- Sveta Sandul, Interpreter
- Katie Fox, Field Program Officer, Civic Program
- Fred Bradley, Field Program Officer, Party/Political Parliamentary Development Program
- Daniel Ebert, former Field Program Officer for Political Party Development

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- Ihor Popov, Executive Director and Chairman of the Board, Kiev
- Yevhen Radchenko, 1st Deputy Chairman of the Board, Kiev
- Dmytro Zarubol, Coordinator, Kiev
- Oleksi Koshel, Media, Kiev
- Yevhen Poberezhny, Coordinator for Kiev
- Andri Yatsemirsky, Office Assistant, Kiev
- Lesyol Fedorets, Financial Assistant, Kiev
- Roman Koshoviy, Chairman, Member of the Student Brotherhood of the Poly-Technical University, Lviv

- Oleh Ilkiv, Deputy Chairman, Chairman of the Student Brotherhood of Poly-Technical University, Lviv
- Andriy Olenchuk, Chairman, Teacher, Ternopil
- Eduard Fil, President, Cherkassy
- Taras Vashkiv, Secretary, Ternopil
- Igor Prikhodka, Coordinator, Cherkassy
- Aratoly Shulak, Assistant Coordinator, Cherkassy
- Orlov Dimitro Sergeivich, member, Cherkassy
- Aleksander Volodimizovich, member, Cherkassy

#### **NGO COMMUNITY**

- Valeri Lapinski, Association of Home Owners
- Mykela Varnire, Nadiya Association for Children with Cerebral Palsy, Lviv
- Vasl Ivanovich Marchenko, Chairman, Families with Many Children, Kiev

#### **REPUBLICAN PARTY**

- Roman Beszmertnyi, Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada
- Alexander Denysenko, Kharkiv Oblast Chairman
- Orest Parubchak, Chairman, Deputy on City Council, Lviv
- Yuri Vehera, Deputy Chairman for External Issues, Lviv
- Petro Hukovsky, Deputy Chairman for Organization, Lviv
- Andri Terpelyak, Chairman of the Secretariat, Lviv
- Volodimir Rakmanov, Journalist, Cherkassy

#### **RUKH**

- Boris Korpan, Deputy Chairman, Lviv
- Vitaly Vakhiev, Chairman, Cherkassy

#### **DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF UKRAINE (DPU)**

- Hrihoriy Kutsenko, Head of the Secretariat of the Party
- Yevhen Petrenko, Deputy Chairman of DPU
- Liubov Mailorada, Coalition Candidate from Cherkassy
- Lyvbou Maidobsov, Candidate for Parliament, Cherkassy
- Leonid Uvarov, Cherkassy

#### **SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

- Grigory V. Rychagov, MP, Committee for Freedom of Speech and Mass Media
- Ludmyla Melnychenko, Assistant to Grigory V. Rychagov working on press matters
- Victor I. Vovk, former Deputy Chairman, President of Information Analytic and Publishing Center

#### **CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

- Oleh Penderetskiy, Chairman of Lviv Christian Democratic Party, newspaper reporter
- Vasyl Kostysky, Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada

#### **REFORM FACTION**

- Ergiy V. Sobolyev, MP, Member of Legislative Commission, Head of Reform Faction
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#### **LIBERAL PARTY OF UKRAINE**

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- Bogdan Pois, Cherkasy

#### **ASSOCIATION OF YOUNG UKRAINIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND YOUNG POLITICIANS**

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- Sigitas Cirba, Mayor of Ukmerge
- Vytautas Landsbergis, Former President of Lithuania, Seimas Member, Leader of the Opposition, Chairman
- Andrius Kubilius, Seimas Member, Faction Leader Party

### **CENTER UNION PARTY**

- Vidmantas Staniuslis, Party Secretary

### **LITHUANIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

- Valdas Petrauskas, Seimas Member, Deputy Chairman and Executive Secretary

### **DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL PARTY**

- Aldona Kadyte, Joniskis City Councillor
- Aleksandra Kubilickiene, Pakruojis City Councillor

### **LIBERAL PARTY**

- Petras Karkalas, Chairman for Siauliai, Businessman, Rotary

### **CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY**

- Regina Gorskiene, Vice Chairman, Siauliai
- Juozas Cereska, Ukmerge City Councillor
- Romas Kalesinskas, Chairman, Kaunas
- Violeta Balciukynaite, Election Coordinator for the Kauno Region
- Limas Rimkus, Chairman of the Health Care Department, Kaunas
- Rankerciene Petre, Coordinator of Media Activities, Kaunas
- Rita Mikutiene, Executive Head of Zemaitkiemis
- Irena Maniukiene, financial and documentation work, Ukmerge
- Aldona Cereskiene, party council and media work, Ukmerge
- Albertas Simenas, former Prime Minister, Head of Environmental Protection Group at Ministry of Economics

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- Ricardas Malkevicius, Director of the Municipal Training Center
- Edward J. Jasaitis, Head of the Department of Public Administration

### **ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF LITHUANIA**

- Valdas Kuzabavicius, Advisor to the President, former mayor of Aletos
- Aldolfas A. Balutis, Vice President, City Council Member of Kaunas, Conservative Party

## LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

## ALBANIA

1. ***Assessment of Parliament\*s and Political Party\*s Receptivity to Reform:*** After the upcoming elections, the IRI resident representative should conduct a full-scale assessment of parliament\*s and political party\*s receptivity to reform, as measured by concrete evaluation benchmarks. If receptivity is determined to be low, then two of IRI\*s three objectives will have been rendered unreachable, and IRI should consider not placing a new representative in-country.
2. ***Change Current “Push-Pull” Model of Cooperation Between IRI and NDI to Even Closer “Hand-in-Glove” Model:*** If the end-of-tenure evaluation shows that IRI should, in fact, provide a new in-country representative, we have several further recommendations. We give high marks to the close cooperation between the current IRI and NDI representatives, but we suggest that in the parliamentary arena their cooperation become even closer, shifting from the current “push-pull” strategy to something like a “hand-in-glove” strategy. A key objective for NDI in the post election period is to improve citizen access to the legislative drafting process; a key objective for IRI has been to improve parliamentary accessibility. Rather than simply hoping these two programs intersect, the two representatives could coordinate specific parliamentary activities, e.g., if IRI helps set up a public hearing, NDI could encourage the Society for Democratic Culture (SDC or Society) to prepare for, attend, and ask constructive questions at such a hearing. Another example: if IRI is pushing parliament to improve access to the gallery and committee meetings, NDI could work with the SDC to request passes and to actually show up at plenary sessions and committee meetings. The SDC could also organize issue-based parliamentary visits from its local clubs and youth groups; IRI could provide training to MPs on how to prepare for such visits, not in the abstract, but on the basis of an actual upcoming visit.
3. ***IRI Representative Extend Stay Through Summer 1997:*** The IRI representative is scheduled to depart in early 1997. We recommend IRI try to keep the current representative in place at least long enough to carry out the above-mentioned evaluation.
4. ***New IRI Representative:*** If a new IRI representative replaces the current one, we suggest the new representative have a similar background in both the legislative process and political party-building; this combination has worked well to date, and would continue to be important even as the program focus changes. Equally important, IRI and USAID should ensure a several week overlap between the departing and arriving representatives. Albanian politics is highly personalized; a direct handshake and introduction by the currently credible and well-liked representative would do wonders to shorten the break-in period of the new replacement.
5. ***Continue Polling to Build Indigenous Capacity:*** Continue polling, with an emphasis on skills transfer in addition to survey results.
6. ***Work with All Political Parties:*** IRI should continue the current policy of working with all political parties.
7. ***Measuring Performance from a Baseline:*** Training activities designed to strengthen political party organization are well executed, and if judged by the evaluations provided by the participants, are having significant impact. However, there are no objective criteria in place to judge the success of IRI training efforts in creating and strengthening political party infrastructure. A questionnaire should be developed to be filled out by party chairmen at all levels to determine the status of political party development for those parties taking part in the IRI training. The questionnaire would serve as the baseline against which to measure change in those areas that IRI has promoted in their training.

8. ***Foreign Observers in the Election Process:*** The Country Team should consider asking USAID/Washington to increase the funding for NDI for foreign observers to participate in the coming national election. Consideration should be given to having at a minimum a 24 member observer team. This would allow two observers for each Prefecture. The two observers would be a part of each of the Society's 12 roving teams to be formed for each Prefecture. This recommendation is made in the context of the tense pre-election environment that is currently unfolding. Depending upon the size of the observer delegation, it may be necessary for NDI to think in terms of a full-time logistics coordinator for the period that the delegation is in country to assist the NDI field representative.
9. ***Civic Education Institutional Model:*** An institutional model and plan should be articulated for the civic education dimension of the Society. NDI should be more explicit in terms of where it is striving to take the Society with the termination of NDI assistance. On which specific part of the civic education objective is the Society going to focus? In view of the fact that many of the leaders in the Society are secondary school teachers, will one of the major targets for civic education programs be secondary school students? Over the next couple of years what will NDI consider satisfactory interim outcomes?
10. ***Financial Sustainability of the Society and Cost Containment:*** NDI, in conjunction with USAID/Albania and USAID/Washington, should review the economic environment and law that affects the status of NGOs to determine if the Society is able to reduce its dependence on USG funding. A constant concern must be the containment of costs associated with maintaining operations of the Society.
11. ***Society's Name Recognition:*** NDI should help the Society strengthen its name recognition as a non-partisan group. This will not only help in terms of its effectiveness, but it should improve its ability to raise money.
12. ***NGO Development:*** In light of the fact that USAID/Albania is initiating a separate effort to encourage the development and strengthening of NGOs, NDI should consider dropping the efforts it has made to work with NGOs other than the Society. At a minimum, it should coordinate closely with USAID/Albania to be sure these activities are not redundant.
13. ***Records on Women's Participation:*** NDI/Washington and NDI/Albania should maintain records regarding women's participation in the activities that NDI supports. Not only should this include data that identifies women that participate in activities sponsored by NDI and their partner organizations, but it should identify the roles women assume after having received assistance from NDI.
14. ***Transportation Requirements:*** Ample resources should be provided to ensure that the NDI representative can move about Tirana in a vehicle for official business.

## BULGARIA

1. ***Maintain Current Objectives and Activities through the Scheduled June Primary:*** In effect, this means helping move the primary effort forward and helping local political structures prepare to implement the Starra Zagora model during the presidential elections.
2. ***Barring a Serious Collapse of the Primary Effort, Keep Both Representatives In-Country:*** The costs of maintaining Phil Tanis for three to four months beyond his scheduled departure are small compared to the benefit of having him in-country during this crucial period.
3. ***Financial Sustainability of BAFECR and Cost Containment:*** Every six months NDI, in conjunction with USAID/Bulgaria and USAID/Washington should review the economic environment and the law that affects the status of NGOs to determine if BAFECR is able to reduce its dependence on USG funding. A constant concern must be the containment of costs associated with maintaining operations of the BAFECR.
4. ***The Outreach Mechanism of BAFECR:*** Every effort must be made to ensure that the structure of the BAFECR's outreach mechanism balances two key concerns--decentralization of decision-making in BAFECR and a least-cost solution. Some cost savings could be achieved by closing some regional offices. However, the bulk of BAFECR's operational costs come from phone bills and salaries for its headquarters staff.
5. ***Drop or suspend the "push-pull" model of cooperation between IRI and NDI:*** There may be areas in which the two institutes can and should cooperate, but the push-pull model is simply not accurate to current activities or objectives in Bulgaria.
6. ***Non-partisan Character of BAFECR:*** NDI should closely monitor BAFECR's operations from the standpoint of BAFECR maintaining their non-partisan status.



## UKRAINE

1. ***Focus on the Local Level:*** Maintain a primary focus at the local level, but balance this with some national-level political party work. As the health of the political system improves, national level party leaders will become more important and will benefit from training and consultation.
2. ***Drop Parliamentary assistance as an Objective:*** As noted, NDI already has a nearly-full-time person working with parliament. IRI's limited resources are best devoted to its first two objectives, unless it chooses to add staff. If so, it should coordinate closely with NDI to avoid redundancy.
3. ***Measuring Performance from a Baseline:*** A questionnaire should be developed to be filled out by each local party chairman to determine the status of political party development for those parties taking part in the IRI training in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odessa, Cherkasy, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil. The questionnaire would serve as the baseline against which to measure change in those areas that IRI has promoted in their training. An approach that could be helpful is reflected in the instruments being developed by IRI in Lithuania to establish a baseline and to identify changes in the future.
4. ***Involve IRI Field Staff in the Selection of Visiting Trainers:*** While trainers on the whole seemed to be good and effective, the program would benefit if IRI/Washington were to involve its field officers more directly in the selection process, and continue its efforts to persuade those trainers who are most effective, as judged by the field staff, to return for repeat sessions.
5. ***Regular Meetings with the Country Team:*** Set up regular meetings between IRI, NDI, USAID and an Embassy political officer. Periodic and regular meetings would not necessarily eliminate Embassy-IRI tensions but would certainly improve understanding. Some of this tension, in our view, is based simply on misreading of the other's position.
6. ***Refocus Local Training Efforts:*** NDI should refocus its efforts on transmitting nuts-and-bolts political party skills such as organizational structure, coalition building, message development, outreach, and candidate selection. It should stay with its current group of five cities for the foreseeable future, eventually expanding to three or four more cities. It should return regularly to these cities to strengthen basic skills, make systematic efforts at bringing in activists from smaller cities and towns surrounding the target cities, and develop a train-the-trainers effort. This would not only broaden the training impact, but strengthen structural links within parties. NDI should also consider bringing in more trainers, perhaps on a volunteer basis to conserve resources, from the United States and other countries, as it has done in the past. With three program assistants on staff, the extra administrative burden would not be unmanageable, and the program would be enriched. Finally, NDI may wish to consider attaching a Ukrainian trainer to its staff; there are currently no Ukrainian "substance" people in the office.
7. ***Redirect or Drop the Local Government Activity in Lviv:*** Given scarce resources, and the large number of municipalities which need assistance, the present situation in which both RTI and NDI are working in Lviv makes little sense. NDI should target its assistance on another city, or drop the effort entirely.
8. ***Strengthen the CVU:*** Help the Committee of Voters of Ukraine develop low-cost ways to maintain its operations and build better name recognition. A more recognizable "brand name" for the CVU will not only allow it to be more effective in upcoming elections, but will enhance its ability to begin raising funds and eventually become self-supporting.
9. ***Discontinue Media Activity:*** Discontinue efforts aimed directly at the media. We view these seminars, which often focus on relatively academic themes such as "ethics in journalism," as unlikely to have concrete impact. Media efforts should be reduced and folded as sub-components back into political party and NGO training activities.

10. ***Monitoring Plan for Political Party Development Work:*** NDI should develop and install a monitoring plan for its program designed to strengthen political party development at the grassroots level. The monitoring plan should contain the following basic elements which could be identified in the workplan:
- # Outcomes or objectives that can reasonably be achieved.
  - # Indicators to identify if the outcomes have been in fact achieved.
  - # A baseline against which to measure performance.
  - # A mechanism for gathering the indicator data that will be compared with the baseline data.
  - # Systematic evaluation of training activities including the performance of the trainers.
11. ***Workplan, Reporting and Meeting Requirements:*** Consideration should be given to installing an annual workplan requirement with quarterly progress reporting. Consideration should also be given to having NDI and IRI progress reporting, be it semi-annual or quarterly, made directly available to USAID/Ukraine. The reporting could form the basis for a formal review by USAID/Ukraine and NDI or IRI of progress and implementation problems that impede activity progress.

## LITHUANIA

1. ***Train-the-Trainers Programs:*** After the October parliamentary elections, IRI should work directly with the larger political parties to help them develop internal training structures. This effort should be intensive, and include not merely training but a period in which IRI goes out with the Lithuanian trainers to observe and coach them. Key training elements should address not only basic political skills but the remaining weaknesses in the political system identified above (weak links with constituents, outreach to swing voters, etc). IRI may wish to find and work with a non-partisan Lithuanian expert trainer, someone like the academic which IRI works with in Ukraine. Smaller parties probably lack the capacity to institutionalize a train-the-trainers program but could be given some help in a group seminar. IRI and USAID should make sure that enough resources are devoted to this effort that it be real and effective, and not simply a brief “throw the notebooks at the trainers” exercise with leftover funds.
2. ***Keep Current In-Country Representative for Train-the-trainer Program:*** We guess that a real train-the-trainers effort would take six months at a minimum; Mr. Grabauskas should be strongly encouraged to stay on through that period. A new representative would be seriously disadvantaged in such an effort.
3. ***Resident IRI Representative Meet Regularly with Country Team:*** The Embassy will profit from the IRI representative's grassroots political knowledge and from having a clearer sense of what IRI is trying to accomplish--and has accomplished--in the country. The Ambassador and Political Officer have expressed interest and willingness to have closer contact.
4. ***Special Effort to Encourage Party Leaders to Invite Youth to Play Larger Role in Political Process:*** Invite youth leadership to attend IRI seminars. This would allow the parties to use the seminars not only as training exercises but as recruitment tools for younger members, something that would be healthy for the overall political system.
5. ***Keep Track of Seminar Participation:*** Keep track of seminar participation by age, political party, region, and large population center. This would allow IRI to target its coverage more precisely and identify potential gaps in coverage.
6. ***Workplan Development and Objective and Outcome Identification:*** Mr. Levinson should prepare a workplan identifying activities and anticipated outcomes for each of the quarters remaining in his contract. He should be encouraged to select objectives and outcomes that reflect the current reality that he has less than nine months to work on this activity. USAID/Lithuania should have the opportunity to review the workplan before it is approved.
7. ***Institutional Arrangement of NDI and the Kaunas Technical University (KTU):*** The particulars of the institutional arrangement between KTU and NDI should be reviewed and perhaps formalized to determine if both institutions share a common vision in terms of NDI's objectives.
8. ***USAID/Lithuania to Monitor NDI Local Government Activity:*** USAID/Lithuania should monitor Mr. Levinson's activities and meet with him at least quarterly to determine the status of workplan implementation. The quarterly report prepared by NDI should be made available to USAID/Lithuania 30 days after the close of the quarter if the quarterly report is to be a useful management tool to focus USAID/Lithuania's review of implementation status with Mr. Levinson.